December 7, 1941, is a day that will forever live in infamy, the day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Exactly eight months later, the United States struck back in the Pacific Theater. On August 7, 1942, elements of the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions, along with several attached units, conducted a seaborne assault in the heart of the Solomon Islands. The target of these assaults was the island of Guadalcanal and the airfield the Japanese were constructing on the northern end of the island. Guadalcanal is a lima bean shaped island at the bottom half of "the Slot," a channel of water between the two rows of islands that comprise the Solomons. The U.S. Navy was concerned about the security of the amphibious force sitting in the Slot with Japanese bases all around. The Navy therefore demanded simultaneous assaults on Tulagi (the capital of the Solomons), Florida Island (rumored to shelter Japanese support forces), and Gavutu-Tanambogo (a tiny combination of islands that contained a seaplane base). (For further information on Gavutu-Tanambogo see the '93b Annual—unfortunately out of print—that contains a mini-HASL module on the assault of these islands). Despite the fact that so many separate assaults were planned as part of Operation Watchtower, remarkably little time went into preparation. On June 25th Admiral Ghormley was told of the goal and instructed to prepare for the operation a mere five weeks away. Ghormley quickly contacted Major General Vandegrift, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, and began planning the assault. Vandegrift immediately asked for a postponement of the target date, since only 1/3 of his unit was in New Zealand, with the remainder either in transit or on garrison duty in Samoa. Only one week was granted, however, the fear was that the Japanese would complete the airfield on Guadalcanal and use it in defending the island. In slightly more than six weeks, therefore, Vandegrift had to develop the plans for the assault on several islands, get his unit to New Zealand, reload it with combat supplies, and ship it from New Zealand to the Solomons to conduct the assault.

The brunt of American combat on Guadalcanal was to be borne by the Marines. Vandegrift's 1st Marine Division was under strength, with only two regiments (the 1st and the 5th) available for the operation. The third regiment (the 7th) was relegated to guard duty. To make up for this shortfall, the 2nd Regiment of the 2nd Marine Division was attached, as were the 1st Raider Battalion, the 1st Parachute Battalion, and various support units such as the 11th Marines (artillery), the 1st Tank Battalion, and the 3rd Defense Battalion. The initial assault force comprised just over 20,000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen.

Facing the Marines on Gavutu-Tanambogo and Tulagi were the thoroughly outnumbered members of the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF)—the Japanese equivalent to the Marines, the Yokohama Air Group, and various construction units. These approximately 900 highly trained men with excellent morale were deployed piecemeal and were totally overwhelmed by the Marine landing force, but they did give the Marines a foretaste of the type of combat to come in the Pacific over the next three years: fierce, tenacious, and "to the last man." Fewer than 30 Japanese were taken prisoner, only 3 of them voluntarily. There were approximately 3,000 Japanese on Guadalcanal, of which only 400 or so were riflemen who were protecting the 2,600 Japanese laborers building the airfield. When the Marines landed, these men melted into the jungle because the Japanese high command thought that the U.S. operation was merely a raid to disrupt construction. This set the standard for Japanese assumptions during the campaign. They continually underestimated the intent of the American plans and the combat ability of the American troops—a fact that would cost them dearly.

On August 7th the landings began on all the various islands involved in the plan. Edson's Raiders and the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Marines assaulted Tulagi, and had the island secured by August 8th. The 1st Battalion of the 2nd Marines was essentially unopposed on Florida Island. The 1st Parachute Battalion and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 2nd Marines secured Gavutu-Tanambogo by August 9th. The remainder of Vandegrift's force assaulted Guadalcanal to the east of Lunga Point and was unopposed. The 5th and 1st Marine Regiments had a simple plan. The 5th would move immediately westward along the coast, protecting the flank and striking towards the almost completed airfield. The 1st would push inland and seize the high ground of Mount Austen, identified as a high-point, which would dominate the airfield. Unfortunately, the Americans had no reliable maps of the island and did not realize that Mount Austen was several miles inland, outside of the planned Marine perimeter. Once the 1st Marines realized they could not take Mount Austen, the remainder of the first day of the assault was spent consolidating forces on the island and unloading supplies. At the end of the first day, over 10,000 Marines were on shore. Despite the beliefs of the Japanese high command, they were there to stay.

Guadalcanal in general was an unknown commodity to the Americans. No maps existed of the island, just some aerial photos of the coastal area from a single reconnaissance flight. Guadalcanal is approximately sixty miles from east to west and 30 miles north to south, in the shape of a lima bean. The north coast has large fields of kumai and palm trees, while the southern two-thirds is dense with hills and jungle. Many rivers and streams cut the island, with few bridges or fords. Many of the rivers end in the Slot, with large sandbars causing the river mouths to become pools of water just before the beach. The heat and ever-present humidity of the tropical jungle caused many problems for both men and equipment. Generally accepted figures have nearly 9,000 Japanese troops dying from disease associated with the tropics throughout the course of the campaign.

On August 8th the 1st Marines moved east, seized the airfield, and formed the Lunga perimeter, which would be their home for the next several months. They renamed the airfield Henderson after a Marine airman who lost his life during the battle of Midway and construction was immediately undertaken to complete the field and put it to American use. It took twelve days to complete the work the Japanese had started and on August 20th the first Marine Air unit landed and began using Henderson Airfield, which would remain the focal point of the entire campaign.

While the Marines were occupying territory and preparing an airfield, the Japanese were busy reacting. Airstrikes were staged against the island with varying degrees of success, and a naval force was dispatched down the Slot to engage the landing force. (The resulting battle of Savo Island was the worst defeat the Navy had suffered since Pearl Harbor, with the loss of several cruisers sunk and several more ships damaged.) Ground troops were dispatched to retake the
island since it had become obvious that the U.S. landings were not just raids.

One of the defining moments of Operation Watchtower occurred on August 8th. Admiral Ghormley granted permission for the carrier fleet supporting the invasion force to withdraw from the area due to "operational considerations." This left Admiral Turner's invasion force vulnerable, so the decision was made to withdraw the entire fleet from the area immediately. This meant that much of the Marines' supplies vanished with the fleet, the Slot was open to the Japanese to freely come and go, and the Marines had no naval air cover or support. The last of the Navy ships and transports left at 1830 hours on August 9th. The Marines felt abandoned and alone.

As the Marines set to work securing their perimeter, their primary questions were "Where is the enemy?" Over the next week, they initiated a number of patrols, with the results indicating that the bulk of the Japanese forces appeared to be near the Matanikau River and Point Cruz to the west of the perimeter.

On August 19th a battalion-size mission was undertaken to drive the Japanese out of the Matanikau village area. The plan was for one company to use the coastal road to approach the village from the east (and across the Matanikau River sand bar), a second company to cross the Matanikau upstream and assault the village from the south, and a third company to make a seaborne landing west of the village to trap any fleeing Japanese. The small garrison the Japanese had left at the village was destroyed. The Marines did not have sufficient force to extend their perimeter to include the village, however, so they returned to their original lines. (See HS1 FIRST MATANIKAU.)

While the Marines were patrolling and clearing Matanikau village, the Japanese were in the process of moving significant land forces into the Solomons region. The Solomons were in the realm of the 17th Army, headquartered in Rabaul, and led by Lieutenant General Haruyoshi Hyakutake. He sent to Guadalcanal approximately 6,000 troops from the 28th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Division, the 35th Brigade, and the Yokosuka SNLF. The first units landed on August 18th: a battalion of 900 men at Taivu Point, east of the Lunga Perimeter, with Colonel Ichiki (commander of the 28th Infantry Regiment), and 500 men of the SNLF at Kokumbona west of the Lunga Perimeter. These were the first runs of what would be nicknamed the "Tokyo Express." With no clear intelligence of what was facing them, the Japanese severely underestimated the strength of the Americans on Guadalcanal (or overestimated their own fighting ability).

Ichiki quickly sent out patrols and waited for the remainder of his regiment to arrive prior to driving the Americans off the island. On August 19th a Japanese patrol ran into a Marine detachment and was destroyed. With the element of surprise now gone, Ichiki changed his plans and moved his men west, thinking that an immediate attack with the single battalion already on hand would best serve to defeat the Americans. On the night of August 20th the Japanese were moving in formation and hit the single strand of barbed wire the Marines had strung along the mouth of the Ilu. This disrupted the Japanese column and a night battle immediately began as the Marines opened up with everything they had. And they had plenty, as they had dug in several heavy machine guns and two 37mm antitank guns along the mouth of the Ilu River (at the time believed by the Marines to be the Tenaru River). The Japanese quickly organized a banzai charge across the sand bar, only to be decimated by machine gun fire and canister rounds fired by the anti-tank guns. An attempt to flank the Marine position by sending a company out in the surf failed. (See G16 ALLIGATOR CREEK.) As dawn approached, the Japanese had been shattered and were attempting to reorganize in a palm grove on the east bank of the Ilu. A fresh battalion of Marines, along with a platoon of tanks then launched a counterattack. The slaughter was complete. The tanks broke the back of the Japanese who had no weapons with which to combat them. Over 800 Japanese were killed at the cost of 34 Marines dead and 75 wounded. Colonel Ichiki was never found, and is rumored to have died while leading a banzai charge across the sand bar. (See HS2 WAR WITHOUT QUARTER which follows the Marine practice at the time in identifying the river as the Tenaru.)
August ended with another inconsequential action west of the Matanikau River, which had no clear objective or any clear outcome. The Japanese withdrew from the Marine attackers, who, following a day of relative inactivity, regrouped back at the Lunga Perimeter. September and October would see increased Japanese activity, leading to the greatest threat to the Marine perimeter and stretching the Marines to the breaking point.

Early in September, natives on the island reported that a large force of Japanese was east of the Lunga Perimeter in the area of Tasimboko and Taivu Point. Marine intelligence did not believe this report, but decided to investigate by sending an amphibious raid against the Tasimboko village where a small garrison was believed to be located. This raid was just the kind of mission for which Merritt Edson had trained his Raiders, who had recently crossed the Slot from Tulagi to assist in defending the Lunga Perimeter. The 1st Parachute Battalion had been folded into the Raiders due to the losses both units had suffered. On the morning of September 8th the Raiders landed near Tasimboko village and quickly stumbled upon Japanese troops and artillery pieces. A brief, pitched battle ensued in which the Raiders were victorious. (See HS3 TASIMBOKO RAID, previously published as A97.) The defending Japanese were the rear guard of the 35th Regiment commanded by Major General Kiyotaki Kagawauchi, who had landed some 3,000 troops at Taivu Point between August 29th and September 1st. As the Japanese withdrew, the Raiders discovered the enemy supply base. They proceeded to wreck the Japanese transmitter, dump the supplies on the ground, and light them on fire, and they dragged several guns into the Slot and sunk them. They then boarded their ships and returned to the Lunga perimeter. Little did they know they would be meeting up with Kagawauchi’s troops again at a ridge on the perimeter.

Following the raid on Tasimboko, Edson’s troops were put in a reserve position on the perimeter guarding a series of small knolls on the edge of Henderson airfield. General Vandegrift had just moved the division command post to this area for safety since the bombings and shellings of Henderson Airfield had been disrupting the operations of the CP. Native guides had again reported an increase in Japanese activity in the area surrounding the ridge on remaining tanks of B Company. (See HS2 WAR WITHOUT QUARTER.)

Generally, the Marine armor had little to fear on Guadalcanal when properly supported. When unsupported, however, it was exposed and vulnerable. (See HS7 WE KNOW WHERE THEY ARE. With no supporting infantry, the Marine armor stumbled into a combined infantry/anti-tank-gun ambush, losing several vehicles and crews.) Marine tank doctrine was in its infancy on Guadalcanal, and it showed. Using the experience gained on Guadalcanal, the Marines soon developed effective support and combined arms tactics.

**ARMOR ON GUADALCANAL**

A tropical jungle island does not lend itself to pitched armor battles. Infantry was the “Queen of the Battlefield” in just about every action on Guadalcanal. Yet both sides felt that armor was important enough to deploy on the island at the expense of other, scarce assets. The Marines, in particular, landed armor ahead of food and other supplies when the Navy pulled out early. Was armor more important than food in the grand scheme of the campaign? Surely not, but armor figured prominently in the offensive and defensive plans of both sides.

**MARINE ARMOR**

The Marines landed A and B Companies of the 1st Tank Battalion and the Self-Propelled Mounts (SPMs)—the M3 GMC halftrack mounting the 75mm field gun—of the 1st Special Weapons Battalion, just prior to the Navy withdrawal on August 9th. Companies A and B were equipped with the M2A4 and M3 light tanks respectively—fairly obsolete by ETO standards. Admiral Ghormley withheld C Company’s superior M3A1s for the defense of the logistical bases in the New Hebrides. In the jungles of the Solomons, however, no tank was truly obsolete. Armor offered protection from small-arms fire and the M2s and M3s were both equipped with decent machine-gun and canister-firing armament. With little or no opposing armor, tanks on Guadalcanal were expected to perform as anti-infantry weapons, a role well suited for the Marine armor. Furthermore, the Japanese deployed their scarce anti-tank assets in a piecemeal fashion.

General Vandegrift kept his armor assets in reserve near the airstrip in anticipation of using their mobility to reinforce any threatened area of the Marine perimeter. The first such instance of their use was following the night attack of Ichiki Butai at the Ilu River. Repeated banzai charges had depleted the ranks of Japanese infantry leaving them bloody but still in a threatening position in a palm grove at the mouth of the Ilu. General Vandegrift, having deployed several SPMs and B Company to the area in anticipation of the attack, wanted to finish off this threat and ordered a counterattack using a battalion’s worth of infantry and the tanks. Driving up to and across the sandbar, the M3s deployed directly into the Japanese position and quickly began devastating Ichiki’s remaining men, who could only retreat into the waiting rifle fire of the 1st and 2nd Battalions. One vehicle was disabled in the fight, but the crew was rescued by the

**JAPANESE ARMOR**

Following the disastrous attacks at Edson’s Ridge, the Japanese continued to feed units onto the island for their final counter-offensive to retake Henderson Airfield. The 1st Independent Tank Company reinforced the Sendai Division (thus making it a “heavy” division in the Japanese order of battle). Like most Japanese tank units, however, it was not at full strength. Accounts vary, but the company amounted to approximately twelve vehicles, mostly the 57mm variant of the CHI-HA plus several HAGO. This unit, like many Japanese units on Guadalcanal, was given a task that was quite simply beyond its capabilities. Neither the HAGO nor the CHI-HA were particularly effective versus infantry, with but a single forward-firing machine gun in most cases.

The Japanese attempted to employ the vehicles as they had in prior campaigns, with quick strikes to break through enemy lines. In the coordinated battles of October, they managed to move the entire Company up to the main line of resistance, the Matanikau, without being discovered. Unlike earlier opponents, however, the Marines on Guadalcanal were tough, confident, and armed with sufficient anti-tank assets to stop any Japanese armored blitz, especially with so few vehicles employed in the assault. A probing attack and a night assault at the mouth of the Matanikau River across a small sandbar marked the end of the 1st Independent Tank Company. The 37mm anti-tank guns the Marines had positioned to guard the sand bar made short work of these terribly outdated vehicles. A lone CHI-HA penetrated the American lines and was quickly hunted down and dispatched by a single Marine halftrack.
which Edson had deployed his troops. This time the Marines responded by sending out patrols to investigate which immediately encountered resistance. When the Japanese began bombing the ridge during their near-daily air raids on Henderson, Edson was convinced that a major push was about to be made. He was right. On the nights of the 12th and 13th, Kawaguchi’s Brigade repeatedly attacked Edson’s unit on the ridge. Significantly outnumbered, Edson’s combined force of Raiders and Paratroopers bent but did not break. They repulsed Kawaguchi’s brigade and turned back what was probably the best chance the Japanese had to take Henderson field. The Marines losses were 31 men killed and 103 wounded while the Japanese lost over 600 men. The battle was known as “Bloody Ridge.” (See the accompanying piece “The Battle for Edson’s Ridge.”)

Several other significantly smaller attacks occurred while the battle for “Bloody Ridge” was going on. An attack across the Ilu was repulsed. This was an ill-planned “diversionary” attack using two companies of Kawaguchi’s Brigade which would surely have been better used in the attack on the ridge. An attack on the west side of the perimeter was easily defeated as well.

With the various Japanese September offensives repulsed, the Marines began looking for ways to take the fight to the enemy. The 7th Marines, commanded by the legendary Lewis “Chesty” Puller, had arrived as reinforcements from their guard duties in Samoa. Vandegrift planned a reconnaissance in the south towards Mount Austen and then west towards Kokumbona to be executed by the 7th Marines on September 23rd. Edson’s Raiders were to push west at the mouth of the Matanikau on September 27th.

Puller’s Marines did not encounter any resistance until the evening of September 24th when they encountered a “strong force” near the base of Mount Austen. The Marines fought until nightfall when the Japanese broke off the encounter. Seven Marines were killed and 25 more men were wounded. Puller requested that the wounded be evacuated. Vandegrift, fearing that Chesty’s unit had encountered a larger force, sent a battalion of men from the 5th Marines to assist. With this new force, Chesty used two companies to escort the wounded back to Lunga while the remainder of his force proceeded west to clear the eastern bank of the Matanikau. By September 26th the 7th had made its way to the mouth of the Matanikau where it began taking fire. With these developments, Vandegrift then changed plans for the Raiders and had them cross the Matanikau some 2,000 yards south of the river mouth at the “one log bridge.” They were then to strike northwest at the rear of the unit engaging Chesty’s 7th Marines at the mouth of the river.

The Raiders encountered a strong force guarding the bridge. (See HS8 BAILEY’S DEMISE.) Major Bailey, battalion executive officer, was killed attempting to force the bridge, while the battalion commander, Colonel Griffith, was wounded. (Edson was now in command of the 5th Marines having been promoted after the battle of Bloody Ridge.) The entire plan then began to unravel. The Raiders were unable to force their way across the bridge, but Marine HQ incorrectly interpreted radio transmissions to the effect that the Raiders had successfully crossed the bridge. Vandegrift, in an effort to capitalize on this “success,” sent two companies of Puller’s regiment on a flanking end-around to the west of Point Cruz. With Puller unable to force the river’s mouth and the Raiders hung up at the bridge, these two companies were in immediate difficulty. All three elements of the operation were engaging the enemy and totally unable to support one another. Puller, realizing that the two companies which had landed at Point Cruz were in serious trouble, commandeered a makeshift fleet of landing craft and struck out to the west to pick up the Marines. Significant personal hercules, including those of Coast Guard Signalman 1st Class Douglass Munro, the only Coast Guardsman to win the Congressional Medal of Honor, allowed this flotilla to retrieve the Marines who evacuated the area having lost only 24 men killed and 23 wounded. (See HS9 AMBITIOUS PLANS and “Ambitious Designs.”)

“All September ended with each side licking their wounds and pouring more troops onto the island.”

September ended with each side licking their wounds and pouring more troops onto the island. The Japanese had finally gotten the pieces into place for their joint-operations plans, which had been worked on since August. The attempts of Ichiki and Kawaguchi had been the first to retake the island, but the units were just too small to defeat the Marines. Hyakutake, now had the 2nd (Sendai) and 38th Divisions in place to augment the remaining 17th Army units on the island. The Sendai was a “heavy” division in that it had armor attached to it in the form of the 1st Independent Tank Company. (This was a company in name only, with only about 12 tanks available.) Hyakutake had an elaborate plan that involved attacking all three sides of the perimeter in coordination with the Japanese Navy attacking in the Slot. Before any of this occurred, however, the Marines launched yet another offensive aimed at the Matanikau River mouth.

Using various units from the 2nd, 5th, and 7th Marines, the plan wasn’t significantly different from the prior efforts the Marines had made. The scout-sniper group from the 7th Marines and a battalion of the 2nd Marines would cross the Matanikau at a fork in the river upstream and secure the high ground to the south of the Matanikau Village, overlooking the west bank. The 5th Marines would drive on the river mouth, with both units meeting at the Village. The launch date of the operation would be October 8th.

On October 7th, as the 5th Marines were moving into position, they encountered Japanese on the east bank of the Matanikau River and immediately engaged them. The Marines began pushing the Japanese back to the river despite several counterattacks throughout the day and the night. With the east bank secured, the 5th then took up positions to begin their assault.

The operation was delayed by a day as torrential rains soaked the area on October 8th. The operation was launched on the morning of October 9th when the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines, led by Puller at the point of the operation, came across a large body of the Japanese 4th Infantry Regiment camped in a deep ravine. Taking up positions around the ravine, Puller’s men poured everything they could into it: small arms, mortar fire, and eventually calling in artillery fire. The battalion inflicted over
700 Japanese casualties while losing only 65 men killed and 125 wounded. The entire
operation was then halted and its units recalled as information on the Japanese
counter-offensive came to light. (See HS10 GOVERNMENT PROPERTY).

Henderson Airfield was knocked out for the first time in the campaign from October
13th through the 15th. Airstrikes were followed by shelling from “Pistol Pete”—the
Japanese 155mm artillery located west of the Perimeter and out of range of anything
the Marines had on the island. This was then followed by the worst bombardment
of the campaign. During the “Night of the Battleships” the Japanese sent the battleships
Haruna and Kongo down the Slot and shelled the airfield the entire night. At dawn
another airstrike hit the airfield knocking it completely out of operation. A rough grassy
runway existed to the southeast of Henderson but it was only suitable for minimal
fighter traffic.

On October 15th the Japanese unloaded nearly 4,000 troops and most of their supplies
at Tassafaronga Point, about ten miles west of the Matanikau. These units were the
last of Hyakutake’s force assembled for the assault on Henderson, a four-pronged attack
scheduled to begin on October 22nd.

Lt. General Maruyama led the main force attacking from the south. This consisted of
Kawaguchi’s force, which would attack from the southeast between the Ilu River
and Bloody Ridge, and Major General Nasu’s force, which would attack from the
southwest between the Lunga River and Bloody Ridge. The second prong was led by
Major General Sumiyoshi and would attack from the west along the Matanikau with
the aid of the 1st Independent Tank Company. Colonel Oka led the third prong, which
would cross the Matanikau upstream and attack from the southwest. The intent of this
attack was to drive the Marines off the ridges to the east of the river and guard the
flank of the second prong of the offensive. The final blow was to be an amphibious
assault at Koli Point. This portion of the operation was canceled, however, as the
Japanese planners thought that Marine resistance was about to collapse.

Once again, however, Japanese plans went astray, this time running up against
the island of Guadalcanal. To get into position, the Japanese columns had to hack their way
through the jungle and over the ridges. This resulted in exhausted men, lost equipment
(the heavier weapons were either left behind or discarded along the trail), and a
blown timetable. Maruyama had to postpone his attack for two days because his
units were not in position.

Sumiyoshi was unaware of the delay, however, when he began his assault on the
afternoon of October 21st. A strong probe consisting of several tanks and infantry was
repulsed by the Marines on the east bank of the Matanikau. All this accomplished was to
alert the Marines, who then began shelling the pre-registered areas immediately behind
the west bank of the Matanikau that they believed to be the staging areas that the
Japanese would use to prepare for their assault. Ten batteries of artillery from the
11th Marines opened up. Once the attack began, anti-tank weapons joined in.
Sumiyoshi’s men had no chance. Several tanks were destroyed in the assembly areas
by artillery fire, and nine more were destroyed by anti-tank and self-propelled
artillery fire as they attempted to cross the sand bar at the mouth of the Matanikau.

Similarly, massed artillery and small-arms fire destroyed the Japanese infantry. The
second prong was defeated before the first was even in position to attack.

Maruyama began his assault on October 24th not knowing that the western attacks
had failed and that he was now walking into an alerted, prepared position. A position,
therefore, that was manned by Chesty Puller’s battle-tested 1st of the 7th, who
generally knew what to expect from the upcoming Japanese assault. To make matters
worse, the Japanese had only machine guns to support the assault, as all other
heavy weapons had been discarded along the “Maruyama Trail” which they had
hacked out of the jungle. (See HS12 CHESTY’S TURN.)

Vandegrift correctly assumed that Maruyama’s attack was the main thrust of the
Japanese operation. He quickly deployed the 3rd Battalion of the 164th Infantry Regiment, an Army unit that had just landed on the island, to reinforce Chesty’s unit. Instead of being deployed as a unit, the 3rd Battalion was broken up and
spread throughout the Marine line. Guadalcanal was now a joint Marine-Army
operation.

Maruyama’s repeated assaults on the now-reinforced lines of the Americans
failed. Upon finally withdrawing, he left behind over 1,500 dead, including several
higher-ranking officers lost leading banzai charges.

The third prong of the assault, Colonel Oka’s force, worked in conjunction with
Maruyama and struck on the night of October 25th. Oka was attacking where the
Marines had no firm line, rather a series of strongpoints on the ridges, and he hit directly
upon a ridge held by the 2nd of the 7th. This battalion beat back three assaults, but
was pushed off the east portion of the ridge by overwhelming forces. Before the
Japanese could consolidate their gains and press the attack, the Marines counterat-
tacked and retook the ridge. Oka was beaten, and so was the Japanese plan. Some
analysts say that the plan was doomed from the start because of its complexity and the
fact that the three prongs of the operation had no direct communications with one another. Excessive Japanese optimism played a part again as well.
Admiral Ghormley in late October, and supplies and troops were now pouring into Guadalcanal. Henderson Airfield now based new fighters and B-17 bombers. It was time to pull Vandegrift and the 1st Marine Division off the island and turn over command. The division had been fighting on the island for over four months and was ready for a period of rest and refit. Command was turned over to General Patch, who had a well-trained core group of soldiers in the various units of the 2nd Marine Division and the 164th Infantry Regiment who remained behind. It would be up to Patch’s men to clear the island.

A strong force of Japanese, the 124th and 128th Infantry and 10th Artillery Regiments commanded by Colonel Oka, had entrenched itself on the slopes of Mount Austen. They occupied the various ridges and slopes leading up to Mount Austen itself. The strongest position the Japanese had was called “the Gifu,” named after a prefecture in Japan, this was a strongpoint of approximately 45 interlocking pillboxes and entrenchments sitting directly on the south flank of the coast road in the foothills of Mount Austen. Reduction of the Gifu would be necessary to assure the Americans of a secure flank while driving west along the coast road. This was not an easy task, however. The jungle was incredibly dense in this portion of the island, with no clearings or trails to facilitate organizing an attack or to help with supplies and wounded—all of which had to be manhandled up and down man-made paths in the woods.

The 132nd Infantry Regiment was tasked with reducing Oka’s position on the slopes of Mount Austen and the Gifu. Operations began on December 17th and continued until January. The 132nd was finally forced to hold up and wait for relief, whereupon it surrounded the Gifu and dug in while the Japanese remained in their stronghold. On January 4th, 2nd Battalion 35th Infantry relieved the 132nd and resumed operations against the Gifu. Finally, the stronghold was cracked on January 22nd, with the support of the single Marine tank able to make it to the Japanese perimeter. This tank destroyed three pillboxes, and the Army moved in through the breach on the Japanese line. With the perimeter cracked, the Gifu collapsed and the 35th Infantry mopped up. (See HS14 THE CHRISTMAS GIFU and HS15 HILL 27.)

While the 35th Infantry was reducing the Gifu, its parent unit, the 25th Division, was moving inland along the coastal highway, eliminating Japanese resistance along the road in order to secure the flank of the 2nd Marine Division in its drive down the coast. While the Marines held the Point Cruz line, the 25th assaulted two ridges; one was called Seahorse and the other Galloping Horse, due to their overhead appearance. Both positions were cleared of Japanese resistance following sharp firesights for the kunai-covered hills. (See HS16 SIMS RIDGE.) The Marines now had a secure flank and proceeded to drive west towards Kokumbona, cutting off the Japanese in the Gifu.

By January the Japanese had decided to withdraw from the island. First, they misdirected the American command into believing another offensive was being prepared when in fact they were planning to leave, using barges, destroyers, and essentially anything that would float. The Japanese needed to buy time for this operation, however, and landed some 600 troops at Cape Esperance to cover the withdrawal. These fresh troops dug in, made a stand at the Bonegi River, and stalled the American advance for several days, after which they pulled back. By February 5th the Americans had advanced to the Umasuni River without facing further resistance.

By this time, General Patch was convinced that there was no Japanese offensive being mounted and that they were in fact withdrawing from the island. A battalion from the 132nd Regiment was landed on the west end of the island to squeeze the remaining Japanese against the Americans advancing from the east. During the first few days of February, neither these troops moving east nor the main body of the American force moving westward met more than slight resistance. On February 9th the two forces met at Tenaro Village, effectively ending the Guadalcanal campaign.

Operation Watchtower marked America’s first major ground action and the start of its island-hopping campaign. It was clearly the turning point of the war in the Pacific. The campaign took over six months to conclude and the men fighting on Guadalcanal endured untold hardship. Nonetheless, American combat losses were relatively light, with 1,600 men killed in action and 4,700 wounded. The Japanese, on the other
The Battle for Edson’s Ridge
by Nadir El-Farra

Introduction
The Battle for Edson’s Ridge occurred little more than a month after the first Marine landings on Guadalcanal. The mission given to the Japanese troops that landed in response on the island in late August was simple—re-capture the airfield. In preparing to carry out their orders, however, the Japanese had badly miscalculated the strength of the Marine forces on Guadalcanal. Hence, in a moment of arrogance Col. Kiyono Ichiki, its first on-scene commander, chose to attack what he thought was a lightly defended position without waiting for the rest of his unit to arrive. The 900-strong assault echelon of his 28th Infantry Regiment walked into a wall of fire and was annihilated at the Ilu River. Unwilling to give up and leave the airfield in enemy hands, the Japanese continued dispatching troops to Guadalcanal.

The Japanese
Under the command of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, the rest of the Japanese Army’s 35th Infantry Brigade (Ichiki’s parent unit) arrived on Guadalcanal. This unit included the 4th and 124th Infantry Regiments—approximately 2,500 men who would later attack Edson’s Ridge. Kawaguchi’s plan was to launch a surprise attack with three battalions on the Marine perimeter from the jungle south of Henderson Field. Two additional battalions would distract the Marines by attacking elsewhere on the perimeter. It was Kawaguchi’s hope that the flank attacks and threats of another sea-borne landing would keep the Marines focused away from the jungle.

Kawaguchi’s three battalions struggled for six days to complete the movement around the Marines’ southern flank. Despite their hopes the Japanese failed to avoid detection—contact with Marine patrols and local scouts confirmed the Marines’ suspicions of an attack from a new direction. General Vandegrift committed a portion of his meager reserves to fill the gap—the call went out to the 1st Raider Battalion with the 1st Marine Battalion attached.

The Terrain
Much of the jungle around Edson’s Ridge was thick and provided excellent cover from aerial observation. The ground between the ridge and the Lunga River 600 yards to the west was waterlogged, with a creek-like lagoon running for some distance parallel to the ridge just west of the ER map. It was in this area that the first Japanese attack on the ridge occurred. Rising steeply out of this green sea of jungle was Lunga Ridge (later known as Bloody Ridge or Edson’s Ridge). It was approximately 1,000 yards long and had two prominent peaks along its spine. It was arrayed with numerous spurs generally perpendicular to the main ridgeline (these spurs would lead the Japanese to call it “the centipede”). Some of the dells around the ridge were so steep and narrow that they were nearly ravines. The ridge-top was generally bald because coral located just below the surface left the ground unable to sustain the growth of anything but short grass. This openness led both sides in the battle to see it for what it was—a ready avenue for rapid movement aimed directly at the prize of Guadalcanal—Henderson Field, less than 1,000 yards north of the ridge.

The Marines
The commander assigned to defend the ridge was Lt. Col. Merritt A. Edson. His 1st Raider Battalion had seen action weeks earlier on Tulagi where it suffered about 100 casualties and more recently at Tasimboko. There, in a daring seaborne raid, it destroyed General Kawaguchi’s newly arrived artillery unit and captured much of the enemy’s supplies. Authorized strength for the Raider Battalion ranged from 800-900 men but it began the battle for the Ridge with only about 500. Attached to Edson’s command was the 1st Paramarine Battalion which had taken heavy losses during its assault on the neighboring islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo where it encountered fanatical Japanese defenders in caves. Authorized strength for the Paramarines was 583 men though it began its assault on Gavutu with only 395. The combined strength of these two battalions was about 800 men at the start of the battle for the ridge.

Dispositions
Marine positions on the ridge were split down either side of the road that ran its length. The Raiders were responsible for the
west flank, and the Para-Marines had the east flank. Each battalion set up its defenses near the forward peak and arrayed their reserves in parallel rows echeloned to the rear. C Company, 1st Raider Battalion (C/Raiders) was responsible for the jungle lowlands between the Lunga River and the ridge. To their left was B/Raiders. To the Raiders’ right was B Company, 1st Para-Marines (B/Para). The Marines added a few strands of barbed wire to their defenses. The meager supply of wire was scrounged from the plantations on the island—their own supplies of wire had left with the retreating navy fleet.

Sometime around dusk Gen. Kawaguchi apparently became aware of the Marines’ defenses on the ridge protecting Henderson Field. Probably because of his poor supply situation, brought on by his decision to “travel light” and assuming that they’d be feasting on American supplies, he decided to attack immediately rather than continue to maneuver his new exhausted troops to find a weak point in the Marine lines. In order to facilitate rapid movement to the ridge he ordered scouts to clear paths towards the ridge and to observe the Marine’s positions.

Opening Blow – 12 Sept. 1942
The Japanese waited until dark to launch their first attack. The plan was for the three battalions (I/124, III/124, and II/4) to attack the ridge simultaneously, but the darkness and the dense jungle caused them to lose their way, with units becoming intermingled. Only I/124 and III/124 were able to engage, and their line of attack missed the ridgeline altogether falling instead upon C/Raiders on the west side of the ridge. Company C’s platoons were somewhat isolated from one another due to the manner in which the lagoon split its positions, forcing C/Raiders to give ground before the Japanese attack. As C Company fell back, B Company had either to retreat or refuse its right flank. The western platoons gave ground until the company’s positions ran north-south rather than east-west. The Japanese failed to rout the Marines, however, and had to grind down pockets of resistance left in the wake of their assault.

Riposte
Dawn brought some respite. In preparation for further Japanese attacks, Colonel Pedro A. del Valle, commander of the 11th Marines (1st Marine Division’s artillery regiment) sent surveyors out to the Ridge to plan defensive fires. Special firing positions were then prepared so that his guns could fire at closer ranges than normally possible.

Considering the ground lost during the night’s attack, the Marines were faced with three choices—recover the lost ground, pull back, or hold in place. A counterattack was ordered and Elements of B and C/Raiders attacked in conjunction with A/Para. Although the attack made some progress Edson called it off. He now had something different in mind.

Meanwhile, Kawaguchi’s III/4 Battalion requested another day to get into its flanking position south-west of the ridge. Anxious not to allow the Marines any more time to improve their positions, Kawaguchi rejected the request and ordered the attack to continue as scheduled.

Preparations for the Next Round
During the day’s attacks Edson was reconsidering his situation: the previous night’s withdrawals had extended his already thin lines; he was sure the Japanese would return for another round; relief by other Marine units was unlikely. On the basis of all of these points Edson decided to pull back about 200 yards. This served to shorten his front, consolidate his troops, and present the Japanese with an unknown in the form of new defenses behind a swath of open ground over which the enemy would have to attack.

By now the 1st Raider Battalion was down to about 400 men. It still held some of the southern hill top, but its main positions were now on the northernly of the two peaks. B/Raiders were again on the left side of the line on the back of the southern hill. A/Raiders, strengthened with the remnants of D/Raiders, was on the right. The battered C/Raiders, Battalion HQ, and E/Raiders formed the Raiders’ reserve.

The 1st Paramarine Battalion had not faced the Japanese on the night of the 12th and was still about 250-men strong. B/Para under Captain Justin Duryea had about seventy-five men and held positions to the left of B/Raiders. C/Para, under Captain Dick Johnson and at about fifty strong, was to B/Para’s left rear overlooking the jungle. A/Para under Captain Bill McKennon formed the Para-Marine’s reserve in the woods to C/Para’s rear.

In their new positions the Marines cleared new fields of fire, added more wire, and dug deeper fighting holes. Colonel del Valle sent two forward observers to the ridge to aid in calling for fire from the 105mm battalions supporting Edson.

Worried about the ramifications if Edson didn’t contain the impending Japanese assault, General Archer Vandegrift ordered his last significant reserve, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) under Lt. Col. William Whaling, to march across Henderson Field from its bivouac to back-stop the composite battalion on the ridge. They were not expected to arrive there until dusk at the earliest.

The First Assault, 13 Sept. 1942
At 1830 hours the Japanese struck again. The 1/124 Battalion under Major Kokusho attacked just east of where C/Raiders had been hit the night before. A B/Raiders rifle platoon was quickly surrounded and the whole company fell back under pressure. Driven out of their holes, B/Raiders reformed just behind the crest of the southern hill and counter-attacked. They regained some ground, but the Japanese had created a 200-yard gap through which they were moving between Marine positions. B/Raiders’ isolated strongpoints were in desperate straits. A/Raiders was isolated between the Lunga River and the gap between it and B/Raiders but was otherwise unmolested. Heavy concentrations of Marine artillery held the Japanese back as they assaulted the ridge. Recognizing the fragility of the troops on the line, Edson relocated his command post just a few yards behind them on the northern peak, positioning himself to see and respond quickly to whatever came next.

Attacking behind a mortar barrage the Japanese charged the Marines while screaming “Banzai!” and “Totsugeki!” (Charge). Combined with some smoke the Marines had just laid down, the shouts sounded to some Marines like “Gas attack” which caused a panic among the Para-Marines. B/Para pulled back about 150 yards ostensibly to prepare a counter-attack. Fearful of a rout, Edson’s second in command, Major Kenneth Bailey used some colorful language to stop the Para-Marines from withdrawing any farther. Throughout the night Bailey brought up ammunition and organized stragglers, sending them back into the line.
The Second Assault, 13 Sept. 1942

With the units on either side withdrawing, B/Raiders was under ever-growing pressure. They, too, began to withdraw under the cover of an intense artillery barrage. With only sixty men left fighting, B/Raiders was hit by leading elements of Major Tamura’s II/4 Battalion as they attacked the right flank down the ridge’s spine. B/Raiders survivors joined Edison at the second hill for a final stand. Numbering perhaps 300 men the Marines scattered around the northern hill faced two battalions of Japanese infantry. For the commander of the Para-Marines, the situation was beyond hope. Edison realized this and placed Paramarine Captain Harry Torgerson in command of 1st Paramarine Battalion and ordered them to counter-attack. Meanwhile, del Valle’s artillery kept up its deadly barrages all around the Marine positions.

The fighting continued all night, frequently resulting in hand-to-hand combat. At one point when some of the men around him began to waver, Edison yelled, “Go back where you came from! The only thing they have that you haven’t is guts!” The line held. At 0230 hours Edison radioed division saying he was “out of the woods” indicating that he expected to hold his position. The Japanese, however, were not yet done with the Marines.

By 0400 on 14 September, elements of 2/5 began arriving to reinforce Edison’s troops. As they moved up the trail, they encountered elements of Major Tamura’s II/4 Battalion that had bypassed Edison’s ridge-top position. The 6th and 7th Companies of II/4 Battalion made it to the north-east end of the ridge. After a fierce firefight in the dawn twilight, about sixty Japanese soldiers made it off the ridge and attacked Fighter One—a support airstrip to the east of Henderson Field. There they encountered Marine Engineers. After an initial setback the Engineers stopped the Japanese advance and restored their positions. The reinforcing 2/5 lost about 50 men reaching Edison’s positions.

Last Gasp - 14 Sept. 1942

The Japanese launched one final assault on the ridge at first light. The Marines, now reinforced by 2/5, were also able to draw on the power of Henderson Field. Three P-400 fighter-bombers rose into the air and plastered the Japanese with bombs and machinegun fire. Though the Japanese were beaten back and forced to retreat, their part-
ing shots nearly brought down one of the planes. Elements of the 1st Marines would later sweep the area south of the ridge. Though defeated, the Japanese put up fierce resistance and caused numerous casualties among the mop-up force.

Epilogue

As hard pressed as the Marines were during this battle, and as effective as their artillery was, had a few breaks gone Kawaguchi’s way, the battle might well have ended very differently. Firstly and most importantly, of the three battalions Kawaguchi brought to the battle, only two managed to participate in the second night’s attack—the II/4 and I/124. Most if not all of the II/124, which had been involved in the 12th September attack, was out of position on the 13th in part because its commander was lost. The added weight of that unit, against the more brittle Paramarine side of the ridge, would likely have been enough to unbalance the Marine positions. This failure would bring Kawaguchi to tears of frustration when he learned of it days later.

Less likely to swing the pendulum as much, but nonetheless likely to have had a significant impact was the fact that the Japanese were unable to employ a 70mm and battalion gun they brought with them. After the battle the Marines found the gun on the southern hill aimed at the northern hill. All around it were unfired shells with a dimple in their primer—the firing pin was too short and couldn’t detonate the rounds. (Boxcars on the To Hit attempt?) If this direct-fire weapon had been active that night, the Marines would surely have taken even worse casualties than they did.

As it stood, the Para-Marines that landed with 395 men on Gavutu left Edison’s Ridge with 86 men walking under their own power. Combined Raider and Paramarine losses on the ridge were 263 killed, wounded and missing. For their heroism in the face of the enemy, both Col. Edison and Maj. Bailey were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Kawaguchi’s men left between 500 and 600 of their comrades on the battlefield and lost more retreating into the jungle to await their next opportunity to attack the Marine garrison. It would take the Japanese a month to assemble sufficient reinforcements and replacements to make that possible.

With all the major components in place, this scenario was ready for a test or two, and I quickly suckered Steve Petersen into a couple of games. The initial version played out remarkably close, with two Japanese wins as the U.S. was unable to exit enough squads (six in the initial version).

There was a problem, however, as the U.S. player was more than happy to leave all the leaders and a small force behind to work over the surviving Japanese while a few LC headed off the map. This also left several LC happy to stay on the beach and pound the Japanese with their 8FP MA. This just wasn’t right, as the entire unit was trying to exit, not just a cadre. Also, balance was a problem since that pesky liaison plane can really slow a rapid Japanese advance. If it enters too early, the Japanese are hard pressed to get to the beach with any force. If it enters too late, the Japanese could fairly easily encircle and slaughter the Marines. This wasn’t going as planned.

Talks with head scenario guru Petersen and playtest buds Jim Turpin, Kevin Meyer, and Carl Fago hammered out the difficulties. We changed the squad exit VC to exit victory points (making Kevin and Jim happy—now the hero is worth a VP), and increased the number of EVP to include the LC. This gives the Marine player real incentive to get the LC and leaders off the map. We then added to the required EVP a number based on the turn in which the plane enters the game. Now the U.S. player may not want that plane to enter early, although they can’t decline or delay its entry.

Finally, representing the flanking fire from Point Cruz also took some figuring. We couldn’t just set a MMG off on the side of the board edge. That begged too many questions. An abstract form of attack, simplified to avoid LOF and target facing considerations, seemed in order. It finally dawned on us, since Residual Fire treats partially-armored LC as unarmored vehicles, a small residual fire attack was the way to go. Rolling a 3 to get a Collateral Attack or a 2 for some real damage means the IJA will have to rely on its ground forces to foil the evacuation. On the other hand, since Passengers Casualty Reduce on a failed MC, those Collateral Attacks can be downright painful on the way home—the Marines will have to bring along some extra VP to hedge against these attacks.

These changes made this scenario, in our opinion anyway, very close. Luckily this turned out to be one of the easy scenarios to design and balance.
Ambitious Plans (HS9) was first published in MMP's fanzine Backblast (Issue #2, now long out of print). Since the editors really like this scenario and it hadn't seen "official print" yet, we decided to include it in the historical study of Guadalcanal. After all, how many Seaborne Evacuation scenarios do you get to see in a game series? The following article is a slightly rewritten reprint of the article which also appeared in BB#2. We hope you enjoy the look at the design process which went into this scenario.

This scenario concept came to me while reading Osprey's Guadalcanal book. If you're not familiar with the Osprey Campaign Series, they do an entire battle or campaign in around 100 pages with lots of photos and illustrations. I use them to gain a familiarity with a campaign and hopefully stumble upon a couple of lines which seem interesting enough to yield a scenario. In this case, I read of Marines retreating to their landing craft while supported by naval fire and air cover. I immediately saw the scenario potential for this battle. The scale was right for ASL. I'm a PTO nut so the theater was excellent. Naval artillery, landing craft, seaborne evacuation, and airpower, too. What's not to like?

Taking the above with a grain of salt, I picked up a copy of Frank's Guadalcanal and the U.S. Army in WWII's Guadalcanal: The First Offensive and did some digging. While there are a few differences between the three sources, they are close enough to be "historical" for me.

The Marines landed a flanking force, pushed inland some 400 yards, then were counterattacked by a strong force of Japanese. The IJA flankers may or may not have entirely encircled the Marine force while it pulled back to the beach (reports vary), but the Japanese certainly tried valiantly to do so. The Marines called in covering naval fire (one heads-up leatherneck used semaphore to direct it), and made it to the beach where they fought off the Japanese until the Higgins boats came to the rescue. Timely strafing runs by a Douglas dive bomber acting as a liaison plane combined with the powerful machineguns on the landing craft to give the Marines time to mount up and escape, having suffered some 45 casualties.

In designing the scenario, I started with the maps. I needed a ridge and a map between the ridge and the beach and ocean overlays. The ridge the Marines had taken was jungle covered to the landward side while grassy on the seaward side so board 39 immediately sprang to mind. I felt the other hill boards were too exposed to reflect the terrain in question, although a good many hills on Guadalcanal were quite bare beside kunai and grass. The generic mix of PTO-type terrain on board 37 adequately reflected the Guadalcanal countryside. Beach size was easy, as the beaches near the Matanikau exist in practically every Guadalcanal book. The real beach was 20–30 feet wide, so I went with one hex of beach and two hexes of shallow ocean to reflect this. Overlays blot out the obvious "out of place" terrain and we have a pretty good representation of the area in question.

Victory Conditions were also rather easy. The U.S. had to exit a percentage of its squads from the map. They were, after all, retreating and the goal was to save the unit. Any other VC would be abhorrent and unrealistic.

Orders of battle? Well, we know the exact U.S. units in question and can nail down the Japanese formation to the battalion level. I prefer small to medium sized scenarios, so I gave the U.S. 13 squads, a good size to represent a company or two. I assigned "historical" leaders, that is I followed Chapter H. The Marines had no heavy weapons that I read about, so I didn't give them mortars or heavy machineguns. The liaison dive bomber which strafed the Japanese on the beach was easy enough to represent by giving the U.S. a single fighter with no bombs and a weak 4 FP MG.

The NOBA is standard caliber for a U.S. destroyer. The sergeant who exposed himself to fire to signal the destroyer's support fire is represented by a hero, and only he can direct the NOBA from on-shore. Letting any SMC (or even any hero) call in the NOBA gave the U.S. more flexibility than was warranted.

I wanted the NOBA to be able to shift to a Shipboard Observer when the hero either loaded-up or became hors de combat but did not want the U.S. player to make this change at will. I also wanted the U.S. to have a definite incentive to use the hero to direct the fire mission. The SSRs capture both of these important elements, treating the hero like a (mostly) regular Observer but with automatic access (and no need for Maintenance unless he moves).

The LC are described as "Higgins boats," which is the nickname by which Chapter H refers to the LCP(L). There were both armed-and-armored and unarmed-and-unarmored LC in the vicinity at the time, but these LC were definitely armed (and thus armored). I felt that the partially-armed LCP(L) best captured both the strength and vulnerability of these vehicles. Highlighting Coast Guardboats Munro from amongst the other LC skippers presented further problems. LC can't have Armor Leaders (for good reason), and the multiple MG on the LC complicated this simulation. Worded this SSR "just right" didn't come easy.

Since something like 1400 Japanese troops were in the area, the Japanese OB could have been much larger, but a smaller, well led force seemed to work better. Fine tuning during playtest bore this out. Standard SW allocation works well for this generic OB.

With the terrain, VC, and forces sketched out, all I needed were start lines and a game length. Since I was looking at turning this into a Pacific "Fighting Withdrawal," I wanted the Japanese (moving first) to be able to just reach the Marine line on their first MPh. Then the Marines would pull back to the next defensive line during their MP. After a couple of tries at getting the timing right I finally found some setup areas that worked. The Japanese hound the Marines all the way to the beach, and an aggressive Japanese commander may be able to encircle the Marines.

Game length was just a math exercise. I added up the amount of time it took a LC to get to the beach, pick up some waiting infantry, and then exit. I added a few turns to allow for beaching/board problems, and that was good enough to start. The final scenario turned out to be 12 turns long, but the last few Turns (if it gets that far) fly right by.

Continued on page 10
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Z. EDSON'S RIDGE CAMPAIGN GAME

EDSON'S RIDGE SCENARIO SPECIAL RULES:

ERI: PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect (EXC: the printed road exists; both Light (G.2.1)/EX: J19) and Dense (G.2.2)/EX: K20) Jungle exist at the same time—Dense Jungle hexes are painted with a darker shade of green).1

ER2 OFF-MAP TERRAIN AND ROADS: The road that exits the North edge of the map is considered for the purposes of A2.51 to extend beyond the map edge in hexes of the same coordinate. Other off-map hexes are a mirror of their on-map counterparts. Thus most off-map edge hexes are interior jungle hexes for purposes of straying, etc. Jungle paths purchased by either player that are placed in a map-edge hex of an Eligible Entry Area are also considered to extend off-map along the same hex grain, or in hexes with the same coordinate. All on-map terrain that is not in play in a given scenario remains in effect for "off-board" movement and entry purposes during that scenario.

ER3 FIRES: Kindling Attempts are NA.

ER4 BURNED-OUT WRECKS: A Burned-Out Wreck cannot be Scrounged, set Ablaze, or removed from play per D10.4 and is a LOS Hindrance exactly like a normal wreck.

ER5 FRIENDLY BOARD EDGE(S): The north map edge is the U.S. player's Friendly Board Edge. Should the Japanese player capture a vehicle that is subsequently recalled, it is instead Abandoned.

ER6 ENTRENCHMENTS: All Marine Entrenchments attempts receive a +1 DRM. Marine Infantry will root towards a Trench as if woods. Marine Infantry receive a -1 DRM to all Rally attempts in a Foxhole as if in woods. Units moving in a Trench lose concealment if moving in woods instead.2

ER7 RAIDERS: U.S.M.C. Raider squads/HS (5-5/8-2-3/8) (G17.111) are designated by a circle around the Marine insignia on the counter. Raider units (including leaders) are Stealthy. In actions involving both Raiders and other U.S. units, use leaders whose names start with letters in the first half of the alphabet for Raiders and leaders whose names start with letters in the second half of the alphabet for non-Raiders (or some other mutually acceptable convention).3

ER8 PARAMARINES: U.S.M.C. Paramarine squad/HS (5-5/8-2-3/8) (G17.111) are designated by both a circle around the Marine insignia and a parachute insignia on the counter.

1. CAMPAIGN GAME

1.1 INTRODUCTION: The Edson's Ridge Campaign Game (ER CG) offers two or more players a series of consecutive scenarios relating to the epic struggle of September 12-14, 1942 for Guadalcanal's Lunga Ridge, just south of Henderson Field. Using the following rules, a variable number of scenarios will be played, each simulating a segment of the battle for this critical hilltop and access to Henderson Field.

1.11 BETWEEN SCENARIOS: Between ER CG Scenarios players will utilize a RePh Phase (RePh). Reinforcement Groups (RGs) will be purchased through the expenditure of Campaign Purchase Points (CPP) allotted by SSR and/or DRs called for under the CG Rules.

1.12 CASUALTIES: U.S. Casualties suffered in a CG-scenario and its following RePh (through CG Scenario End), must be recorded until ≥ 19 total CVP are accumulated. This is used for determining which RG may be purchased (1.518).

1.13 TEAM PLAY: The ER CG can be adapted to team play with multiple U.S. players commanding Marine Raiders, Para-Marines, and regular Marines, or by map sector (as was done historically between the Raiders & Paramarines). The Japanese players could also divide the map by sector or, if they decide to use RGs from the Lost Battalion, one player could command all troops entering from that map edge. In any case, an enjoyable addition can be the appointment of an overall commander who decides which team member receives support in the form of RGs and the like.

1.14 CG ROSTER & RG PURCHASE RECORD: The ER "CG Roster" and "RG Purchase Record" provided should be photocopied and used to keep track of RG purchased and CPP spent/remaining. Their use will be covered in more detail later in this chapter.

1.2 DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS: The following glossary explains abbreviations and important terms used frequently in the ER CG.

CG: Campaign Game.

CG Date: The CG Dates are: 12 Sept Night, 13 Sept Day, 13 Sept Night I, 13 Sept Night II, and 14 Sept Day.

CG End: The CG-Scenario End that occurs on the "14 Sept Day" CG Date (or if one side concedes CG Victory, the CG-Scenario End that occurs at the conclusion of the the final CG scenario played in that CG) is also the CG End.

CG Roster: The sheet used to record information for each CG Day. One line is filled out for each CG Day. Photocopies are permitted and encouraged.

CG-Scenario End: Occurs when both the CG scenario and the ensuing RePh step 1.503 have been completed.

CPP (Campaign Purchase Points): Used to buy RG in RePh step 1.518.

Depleted: A RG not received at full strength.

Eligible: The status of an Entry Area enabling its use by a side for entry (and other purposes).

Eliminated: Units/Equipment/Fortifications "Eliminated" in a CG are removed from that side's OB (i.e. are not Retained). OBA modules that have placed a FFE [EXC: Illumination] in the just played CG scenario are Eliminated. Any radios, field phones, Offboard Observers, and pre-registered hexes associated with that module are also Eliminated.

Entearable: A hex/Location that the unit in question could enter (disregarding its occupation by a fortification/enemy-unit) during a hypothetical MP/PAH. If defined in relation to a Setup/Entry Area (or to a "path" of hexes drawn from/between such), the hex/Location must be Entearable along that "path." A terrain or hex that is not Entearable.

Entry Area: Each map-edge hex that contains a large arrow with a green or yellow background color, plus each map-edge hex within four hexes of that hex, plus the holding box (see definition below) of that Entry Area. The nationality symbol(s) in the arrow indicate(s) if the Entry Area is used by the U.S. or the Japanese. See also SSR CG.

Equipment: Any SW/Gun/Vehicle that can be part of a side's OB. Any counter that can be Portaged/Driven/Manhandled about the map.

ER: Of, or pertaining to, the Edson's Ridge Campaign Game in the Operation: Watchtower Guadalcanal Historical Study.

Escape: The process by which a unit attempts to leave an Isolated Area (1.506).

FPP (Fortification Purchase Points): Used to purchase Fortifications in RePh step 1.520.

Front Line Hex: A Setup Area hex that shares ≥ one hexside with ≥ one hex of an enemy Setup/Area-No-Man's-Land/Uncontrolled-Territory.

Full Strength: A RG received in toto.

Holding Box: The off-map portion of an Entry Area. It is used for holding all units/Equipment that are retained in, as well as those that will enter play as reinforcements via, that Entry Area. Each Holding Box contains the hex coordinate of that Entry Area's center (arrow) hex, an ID letter/number, the CG Date on which the Entry Area becomes Eligible, a portion for the placement of reinforcements, and a portion for exited units/Equipment.
1.2 (Idle Date)

Idle Date: A CG Date in which both sides have picked an idle chit (no CG Scenario is played).

Initial Scenario: The "12 Sept Night" CG-scenario. The Initial Scenario gives each side's setup of forces and restrictions. Initial Scenario Victory Conditions, starting OB (including certain predetermined RG and a pool of CPP to spend on additional RG) and the SSR applicable only to that Initial Scenario.

Isolated: A unit/Equipment in a friendly Setup Area Location from which it cannot trace a path of contiguous, Enterable, Uncontrolled-Territory/friendly-Setup Area Locations to a friendly Setup Area or Entry Area.

No Man's Land: A non-Strategic Location within two hexes of both friendly and enemy-Controlled Strategic Locations.

OB (Order of Battle): All the units, Equipment and Fortifications of a side that are eligible to participate in the next CG scenario. Includes all Retained units and Equipment, plus all RG purchased since the last CG scenario.

Objective Hex: Each initial-OB given or purchased RG whose ID on a Reinforcement Group Chart begins with an "F" (note: not "FW") allows the owning side to secretly designate an Objective Hex during RePh step 1.5.188. An Objective Hex remains a potential Strategic Location even if not revealed on the CG Date it was designated. As soon as (but never before) such an Objective Hex is Controlled (as per A26.11-a; even if during setup) by Infantry of the designating side, its identity must be revealed to the opponent and it becomes a permanent Strategic Location. Once revealed, use a Control marker of the Controlling side to mark the hex. When designated, such a hex cannot already be a Strategic Location and must have an in-hex TEM ≥ 1 (including existing entrenchments but excluding Height Advantage).

Pltn (platoon): A CG Infantry or Heavy Weapons organization type.

RePh (Refit Phase): The series of steps performed between CG scenarios. All rules beginning with 1.5 are RePh rules/steps.

Reserve: "I", "HW", "G" or "V" type RG (of either nationality) purchased at a cost of one less CPP than that listed on the RG Chart may set up on-map; see ER SSR CG7.

Retained: All units, Equipment and RG in a side's OB that are available for set-up in the next CG scenario, i.e., all Initial Scenario OB given/purchased units and Equipment (or all units and Equipment remaining) available from the previous scenario of the CG, and all RG purchased since the previous (if any) scenario of the CG. A unit ending a CG scenario in a friendly Setup Area must begin the next CG scenario in that same Setup Area (i.e., Exclude, Shift).

RG (Reinforcement Group): Usually a number of units/Equipment purchased, as a group, for use in the CG as additions to a side's OB. Also includes RPD, SAN increase, OBA and Pre-Registration.

RG Purchase Record: The sheet used to record the unit-information for each CG RG type. One line is filled out for each RG purchased. Players are urged to photocopy the one provided herein.

Sect (Section): A CG Vehicle or Ordnance RG organization type.

Setup Area: Each Strategic Location Controlled by a side, plus each non-Strategic Location within two hexes of such a Strategic Location but not within two hexes of an enemy-Controlled Strategic Location (i.e., not a No-Man's Land hex, 1.5051). Each such non-Strategic Location hex must also be Enterable by Infantry from ≥ one Strategic Location of that Setup Area. Friendly Setup Areas that touch/overlap are treated as a single Setup Area, provided that ≥ one of the touching/overlapping hexes is Enterable by Infantry from the other Setup Area. For Initial Scenario, see also I.4.

Strategic Location: Each Level 4 Hill hex, Pillbox, 2- or 3-Squad Fochole, Trench, Jungle Path, Entry-Area hex must have been used by at least one RG to qualify and each Objective Hex known to both players is a Strategic Location.

Each hex occupied by a non-Abandoned immobile vehicle with functioning MA and/or a possessed non-malfunctioned Gun is a Strategic Location. Should the vehicle/Gun subsequently be destroyed (or moved in the case of the Gun) the hex ceases to be a Strategic Location (unless some other characteristic causes the hex to remain Strategic).

Strength: An Infantry or Heavy Weapons Pltn is received either at Full or Depicted Strength.

Uncontrolled Territory: All non-No-Man's Land hexes that are part of no Setup Area i.e., ≥ 3 hexes from all Controlled Strategic Location hexes.

Weapon: Any SW/Gun/Vehicular-armor arrangement using the IF/TH table(s) to cause damage to the opponent.

1.3 CAMPAIGN GAME SPECIAL RULES: The following CG SSR apply in all ER CG Scenarios and RePh:

CG1. MAP: Each CG Scenario uses the entire ER map.

CG2. ER SSR: All ER SSR are in effect except as amended below.

CG3. WEATHER: The historical weather for each CG Date is listed in 1.517. Alternatively, players may agree to use the optional random weather table provided.

CG4. ELM/MASSACRE: Each side's printed ELR given in the Initial Scenario of the CG is also treated as that side's printed ELR for all subsequent scenarios of the CG if EXC: If a Massacre (A20.4) occurs during any CG scenario/RePh, all effects listed in A20.3.A are applicable for the remainder of the CG; the CG Scenario Defender's ELR at night is one less than it would be in a daytime scenario).

CG5. NIGHT SCENARIO: The NVR of a CG Night scenario is determined using E1.11 and the historical Moon Phase and Cloud Cover given in the 1.517 Table. The side selecting an Idle chit in a night scenario has automatic freedom of movement (following any enemy attack besides a successful ambush; E1.21) for his two best non-Reserve leaders. The side selecting an Attack chit is considered the Scenario Attacker and may use normal Cloaking (E1.4.43) for his Infantry, even if they set up on-map (use a different color than on-map reserves). Cloaking-counter HIP is NA. Scenario Defender reinforcements Retained off-map may enter an Eligible Entry Area only following a RPh in the current Game Turn number, or automatically once any Scenario Defender unit has been attacked by other than OBA/Sniper or has been seen a Known enemy unit. An AFV with a radio that gains freedom of movement releases other friendly AFV with radio as per E1.21 EXC: those in Reserve. Radio-equipped AFV entering as reinforcements also cause on-map non-reserve AFV to gain freedom of movement.

CG6. ENTRY AREAS: A large green or yellow arrow with an identifying letter or number denotes the center hex of each nine-hex-wide Entry Area. If it is a Japanese Entry Area the arrow contains a red sun and the CG date on and after which the Entry Area is available for entry. If it is a U.S. Entry Area, the arrow contains a star.

CG7. RG SETUP/ENTRY: Each RG listed in an Initial Scenario's OB is available for on-map Setup/entry as specified. For RG purchased with CPP, setting up on-map costs one additional CPP; while setting up in Reserve Status costs one less CPP (per RG in either case). If set up on-map, units/Equipment of an RG must be set up in the friendly Setup Area they are Retained in or as defined by Initial Scenario Setup restrictions). Units which set up off-map during the RPh (A2.51) but do not enter the same Player Turn are unavailable for use during the remainder of the current CG Scenario. Such units are, however, Retained for the next CG Scenario. All units/Equipment of the same RG must initially either be set up in the same Setup Area or on any hex(es) of the same Entry Area. Equipment of a purchased RG must initially be possessed by a unit of that RG.

a) Reserve Status: RG purchased as reserves use the principles of Cloaking (E1.4; see below also). Each Reserve RG purchased yields one Reserve Cloaking counter (i.e., a 1/2" 7/8" of any unusual national identity) for each MMC that will set up as Infantry, plus one for each vehicle, in that RG. Each Reserve RG may, at its owner's option, include one Reserve Dummy Cloaking counter (usable in either a day or night scenario). Each Reserve Cloaking counter may represent a maximum of one vehicle (plus its PRC and towed Gun) or one Infantry unit stack (and its possessed Equipment), and must be set up in a non-iso-
lated, friendly Setup Area Location ≥ 8 hexes from all enemy Setup and Entry Areas. Reserve Cloaking-counter HIP is NA. The pertinent CA/CE-status information of each Reserve vehicle must be recorded (each Reserve AFV is considered CE unless noted otherwise by the owning player). The Cloaking counter of a Reserve AFV in bypass is set up in the hex in the normal manner rather than straddling its hexside, but that hexside and the vehicle's CAFP must be recorded. Reserves cannot Deploy/Recombine, and are ignored for the purposes of Deployment/CHIP/"?" limits. If unable to set up in Reserve, such RG is instead Retained in an Eligible Entry Area’s Holding Box, but cannot enter play until the following CG Date.

b) Release: During a CG scenario, each Reserve unit/stack must remain Cloaked—and may conduct no action whatsoever—until an enemy ground unit is in its LOS within six hexes, or until subjected to an enemy attack (including Bombardment/WP/Sniper) that results in loss of the Cloaked Reserve unit/stack's concealment, at which time its owner may (or must if the Reserve Cloaking counter was so attacked or was revealed by Searching or Detection as per A12.15) reveal that Reserve Cloaking counter’s contents (if any) by placing them on-map, unconcealed. In general, the contents (if any) of a Reserve Cloaking counter are considered to not exist until they are revealed:

- A non-Cloaked Dummy stack and a Reserve Cloaking counter may neither set up, nor end a phase, together in the same location;
- A Reserve Cloaking counter is a non-target to an enemy Sniper attack (A14.22);
- A Reserve Cloaking Leader may not use his leadership benefits for any purpose;
- If a Flame/Blaze occurs in a Location that contains a Reserve Cloaking counter (even a Dummy), that counter may move/advance once to an ADJACENT non-blasting Location—provided it is not moving closer (in hexes) to an enemy ground unit regardless of LOS. If it cannot do so, its owner may at that time place it anywhere within 3 hexes of its current hex, though he may not place it closer to an enemy ground unit and must otherwise abide by the rules pertaining to Reserve Setup;
- Each Dummy Cloaking counter is Eliminated at the end of play (RePh step 1.502d);
- Each RG unit/Equipment piece that is still Cloaked at scenario end is revealed (1.502d) and Retained;

CG8. ABANDONMENT: A Retained vehicle may begin a CG Scenario Abandoned, but the resulting crew counter must begin that CG scenario in the same Setup/Entry Area as the vehicle it came from.

CG9. STATUS MARKERS: During Setup, each side may opt to secretly record the BU, CE, TCG, bagged, Immobilized, Abandoned, malfunctioned and/or Disabled status of its vehicles/Guns in lieu of placing the appropriate marker(s) on them. Place the actual marker(s) when the piece is unconcealed and within 16 hexes of any enemy ground unit which has LOS to it.

CG10. CONCEALMENT: Each Infantry unit (and its possessed Equipment) setting up in concealment terrain may be set up concealed, regardless of enemy LOS. Vehicles may not be set up concealed unless out of enemy LOS. Such "?" need not be purchased; i.e., each is placed freely. Otherwise, A12.12 applies in the normal manner. Eligible units may be concealed prior to the opponent viewing the setup. For purposes of "?" placement, all Locations outside the LOS of all opposing Setup Area Locations are considered concealment terrain.

"?" purchased in the RePh and those received at night (E1.2) are used as dummies.

CG11. BORE SIGHTING & GUNS: Bore Sighting is NA [EXC: Eligible SW MG may boresight at night]. A12.34 applies in the normal manner. Each non-vehicular Gun that ended the last CG scenario on-map must be set up within three hexes of the Location in which it ended that scenario [EXC: mortars; Escape: if an Idle Date has occurred].

CG12. OBA: On an OBA RG's CG Date of purchase, its radio (or field phone (U.S. only) is placed with non-Isolated Personnel in any friendly Setup/Entry Area [EXC: if an Officer/Observer was purchased, no radio is received]. Field phones may be purchased in lieu of radios only if they are set up with non-Isolated Infantry and their Security Area (C1.23) comprises Enterable Locations that are not within an energy Setup Area, and are drawn to a map-edge that contains ≥ 5 edge-hexes of a U.S. Eligible Entry Area. If Retained from a previous scenario, a new Security Area may be recorded for each CG Scenario. Pre-registered hexes may also be re-assigned if the associated OBA module was Retained. See the 1.2 definition of Eliminated.

CG13. OPTIONAL SNIPER USAGE: Upon mutual agreement, each side may use two Sniper counters [EXC: Both players only use one during the Initial Scenario]. Each Sniper counter must be set up initially as per the first two sentences of A14.2, but with ≥ 10 hexes between them (or as far apart as possible if they cannot set up ≥ 10 hexes apart); when a Sniper attack can occur, make a dr to randomly determine which one actually attacks. The SAN is never altered by the presence of > one friendly Sniper in play simultaneously. Any result affecting a Sniper counter affects all friendly Snipers. See also 1.5122.

CG14. TERRAIN CHANGES: Each alteration of printed terrain that occurs during a CG scenario is permanent, barring subsequent Clearance/Removal (as applicable). All Fortifications, Shellhole, Rubble, Trailbreak, Jungle Path, and (Burnt-Out) Wreck counters are left on-map from scenario to scenario. Each terrain Blaze is resolved in RePh step 1.509. No Wreck is removed from play due to being in a terrain Blaze; it remains on-map (still treated as a LOS Hindrance) and in RePh step 1.501 it becomes/remains a Burnt-Out Wreck. Whenever a vehicle is Immobilized, Abandoned, and all of its present Inherent Weapons are Disabled (or it has no Inherent Weapons), it is immediately replaced by a Burnt-Out Wreck. Whenever a non-Burnt-Out Wreck is Scrongued (if it had any Scronguable Weapons), it is immediately replaced by a Burnt-Out Wreck. Regardless, vehicles which have no Wreck depiction can never turn into a (Burnt-Out) Wreck.

If a 70+mm (or larger) OBA module achieves an Original KIA result against a light jungle hex, place a shellhole maker in that hex and treat as a Palm hex thereafter [EXC: the shellholes are present]. If the target hex was dense jungle, it becomes a wooden rubble hex [EXC: it is still treated as a jungle hex for purposes of Kindling and Spreading Fire]. All such terrain changes are permanent (i.e. will remain on-map for each subsequent scenario). Further KIA results against hexes already affected in this way have no additional effect.

CG15. PRE-GAME BOMBARDBMENT: Both sides have pre-game bombardments available as purchased RGs when selecting an Attack Chit. Due to the differences between the ER map and a normal ASL board, however, the regular bombardment rules are modified as follows:

The Purchasing Player chooses one or two 10x15 hex Bombardment areas. The areas must have at least 7 hexes adjacent to one another, although they need not form a rectangle; they may not overlap, must be aligned along the same Hex Grain, and all their hexes must be in play. Once the Bombardment areas are chosen, the players write in the appropriate hex coordinates on a copy of the Bombardment Plotting Sheet provided. Hexes immune to bombardment are now rolled as if a single map-
board was being bombarded (C18). The U.S. player (only) has the option, which must be declared prior to plotting the Bombardment area, of using only a single 10x15 hex Bombardment area and subjecting it to a 3MC instead of a 2MC.

CG16. JUNGLE PATHS: Both sides have Jungle Paths as an available FFP purchase. Each purchase allows the player to place 3 path markers on map during the RePh (step 1.520); use TB markers if you run low on path markers, or alternatively, cover your mapsheets with plexiglas/acetate and draw the paths with a grease-pencil/alkohol marker). All path markers from any one path purchase must be placed ADJACENT to one another [EXC: they may be separated by an Open Ground or Palm hex]. A path marker placed through a Bamboo or Dense Jungle hex counts as two hexes' worth of path placement. Unused path hexes may not be saved from CG Scenario to CG Scenario—any that are not placed during RePh step 1.520 are lost. Paths cannot be set up using HIP and are revealed prior to scenario setup (RePh step 1.5232).

CG17. WIRE: When determining the MF required to move below a Wire counter, subtract 2 from the dr. Under no circumstances can the extra MF cost be less than “1.”

CG18. FFP BARRAGE: A FFP Barrage is a special type of 60-mm HE (only) Barrage (E12) RG available for purchase by the U.S. player if he is selecting an idle initiative chit for the upcoming scenario [EXC: if he does not place the FFP Barrage, he receives the RG the next time he selects the Idle initiative chit]. No Pre-Registered hex is required. Radio Contact, Battery Access, and Correction/Cancellation are NA. A FFP Barrage FFE Blast Area is two hexes wide by five hexes long. Its designated Blast Area is openly recorded prior to all setup [≤ 2 two per CG-Scenario]. All hexes in the designated Blast Area must be within 5 hexes of any one U.S. Setup/Entry/Area from which a hypothetical Observer would have LOS (disregarding NVR) to the base level of ≥ one of those hexes. The U.S. player may place the FFP Barrage at the start of any friendly FFP/FDP or enemy MP. A FFP Barrage counter is placed in each of the four corners of the Blast Area, adjacent to one another and four hexes away from another. After placing the four FFP Barrage counters, the U.S. player makes an Accuracy dr to see if the Barrage lands accurately. On an Original dr ≤ 4, it does. On an Original dr ≥ 5, it does not, and the U.S. player places an AR counter on any FFP Barrage counter and makes a C1.31 DR, with the white die equal to 1. Move the FFP Barrage counters accordingly, and remove the AR counter. For each FFP Barrage in play, the U.S. player makes a dr at the start of each U.S. RePh beginning on the fourth Turn after placement [EXC: the dr on the fourth turn receives a +1 dr]. On a dr ≥ 5, the Barrage is removed. Otherwise, all Barrage rules apply.

CG19. MAP EXIT: Each Personnel/Equipment piece that exits the map via a Friendly Entry Area during play cannot re-enter the map during that scenario but is Retained for use during the next CG scenario. However, each such broken Personnel unit must take a NTC (a Good Order leader’s DRM can apply) immediately upon exiting; failing this NTC causes Casualty Reduction (if it is Eliminated, so is its possessed Equipment). Everything exiting from the map from any other Location is Eliminated.

CG20. RETAINED RG: Regardless of whether it was used during a CG Scenario, each purchased/OB-given RG is Retained until Eliminated in a CG scenario. Each unentered RG (or part thereof) is Retained.

CG21. GAME END: Each CG Scenario has a variable Game Turn Length. At the end of each Player Turn of Turn 6, and at the end of each Player Turn thereafter, the Attacker makes a Game End dr; if the result is ≤ the circled number in the current Turn’s box on the CVP/VP Tally Chart, the scenario ends immediately. Additionally, a CG scenario ends if both the ATTACKER and DEFENDER agree to end the scenario.

1.4 INITIAL SCENARIO: The special information needed to play the Initial Scenario for the ER CG is provided after 1.42. For the Initial Scenario, both players begin with RePh steps 1.518 (RG Purchase Record) and RePh steps 1.518—1.5232 (the steps preceded by a “x” in the RePh Sequence; 1.5).

1.41 ER CAMPAIGN—“Bloody Ridge”

CG LENGTH: A CG Scenario may be played on all 5 CG Dates of the CG.

CG VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Japanese win at CG End by annaining ≥ 73 Victory Points and Controlling ≥ 5 Level-4 Hill hexes. VP are awarded/deducted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HILL HEX CONTROL VICTORY POINTS (BY DATE)</th>
<th>Per Level 4 Hex:</th>
<th>12SeptN</th>
<th>13SeptD</th>
<th>13SeptNI</th>
<th>13SeptNH</th>
<th>14SeptD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hill #100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill #120</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/Item</th>
<th>Victory Points Awarded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good Order JIA Squad-equivalents exited through U.S. Entry Area 1</td>
<td>CVP value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Order JIA Squad-equivalents on/north of hexrow KK at CG End</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2}$ CVP value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIA purchase of any Lost Battalion RG</td>
<td>-10 VP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIA purchase of ≥ 2 Bn Gun RG</td>
<td>-2 VP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIA purchase of Regt'1 AT Gun RG</td>
<td>-3 VP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. purchase of any Vehicle RG</td>
<td>+10 VP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. purchase of any AT Section RG</td>
<td>+8 VP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. purchase of any Pioneer RG</td>
<td>+5 VP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. purchase of 2 Engineer RG</td>
<td>+5 VP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. CPP remaining at CG End</td>
<td>-1 VP per CPP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* applies only once.

Such units must be ≤ 2 hexes from a hill hex that is ≤ 6 hexes from a road hex.

1.42 INITIAL SCENARIO SETUP SEQUENCE: American player sets up first, Japanese player moves first.
INITIAL AMERICAN OB:

B Company, 1st Raider Battalion; B Company, 1st Parachute Battalion [ELR: 5] set up on/north of hexrow K. Raidders set up on/west of the road. Para-Marines set up on/east of the road (consider the road to extend through O14-N13-M14-L13-K14 for this purpose) (see SSR L2-L5): [SAN: 2]
- 8-1 × 1  8-0 × 1  RG: Raider Rifle Platoon × 3
- RG: Parachute Rifle Platoon × 1  RG: Raider Weapons Platoon × 1
- Trenches × 3, Wire × 4, 1S Foxholes × 8, 15 FPP  10 CPP
- RG: 100-mm OBA Module with Normal Ammunition and one Pre-Registered Hex

INITIAL JAPANESE OB:

Elements of 4th and 124th Infantry Regiments [ELR: 4] OB-given units may set up within 6 hexes (inclusive) of Entry Area A in hexes numbered ≤ 10. All purchased units must enter from Entry Area A on or after Turn 1 (see SSR L5): [SAN: 2]
- 9-1 × 1  RG: Rifle Platoon × 6  RG: Weapons Platoon × 1  10 CPP
- RG: 70-mm Battalion Gun OBA module with Plentiful Ammunition, one Pre-Registered Hex and an Off-board Observer.

INITIAL SCENARIO SPECIAL RULES:

The following SSR apply during the Initial Scenario:

1.1 EC are Wet, with No Wind at start. Night rules are in effect with Base NVR of 3. The Moon is Full and there are Scattered Clouds. The Japanese are the Scenario Attacker; the Marines are the Scenario Defender. The Majority Squad Type for the Japanese is Stealthy, and for the Marines it is Normal.

1.2 All U.S. Infantry units must set up in Fortifications—should there be insufficient space, the excess units may set up normally.

1.3 Place a Wire counter in each of the following hexes: N3, N5, N7 & N8

1.4 Place a Foxhole (any size) from the Marine OB in each of the following hexes: O4, O5, O8.

1.5 IJA units may not be set up in Reserve. Any U.S. Reserves purchased must set up on or north of hexrow R.

1.6 The Game End dr is modified by -1.

1.5 REFIT PHASE: The following steps (1.501-1.523) are performed simultaneously by each side during the RePh, which occurs after each CG Scenario. Each step (and sub-step) must be carried out in the numbered/lettered order given; those not applicable to the current situation may be omitted (e.g., if there are no Flames/Blazes on the map, skip RePh step 1.509). Those steps listed below preceded by an “x” are the only steps to be completed before setting up to play a CG Initial Scenario. Those preceded by a “y” are the only steps necessary to achieve CG-Scenario End after the last Player-Turn CCP. Those preceded by a “w” are performed in repeated sequence until a new CG scenario is generated in RePh step 1.522.

RePh Sequence
- 1.501 Conclusion of Melee
- 1.502 Marker Removal

y1.503 Rally
1.504 Encirclement, Bog, and Shock
1.505 Setup Area Determination
1.506 Escape
1.507 Equipment Possession and Hidden Fortifications
1.508 Prisoners
1.509 Extinguishing Flames and Blazes
1.510 Wounded Leaders
1.511 Recombining and Battle Hardening
- 1.512 New CG Date and SAN Adjustment
- 1.513 Shift
- 1.514 Equipment Repair and Replenishment
- 1.515 Reinforcements
- 1.516 CPP Replenishment
- 1.517 Weather Determination
- 1.518 Purchasing Reinforcement Groups
- 1.519 RG Strength, Weapons, and Leaders
- 1.520 Purchasing Fortifications
- 1.521 Purchasing Reconnaissance
- 1.522 Initiative Determination
- 1.523 Scenario Commencement

1.501 CONCLUSION OF MELEE: All opposing units in the same locations are now assumed to be in Melee [EXC: H-H Melee if so marked or if the Japanese player moved first that scenario]. Units in such locations must undergo an unlimited number of Melee rounds until no more CC attacks can be made. Such units are free to perform any/all normal CCP activities associated with Melee (i.e., Attack, Capture, Withdrawal, etc.). The side that moved first that scenario is considered the ATTACKER. Following the conclusion of the first round of RePh Melee in a Location, each still-hidden/concealed unit in the hex is revealed, each pinned unit in the hex becomes unpinned, all CX counters are removed from the hex, and each Sun counter therein is flipped to its “+1” side (the vehicle may still be Recalled, if applicable, and may be marked CE if so desired).

1.501I ORDER OF RESOLUTION: Resolve all Meleses in alphanumeric order (e.g., A1, then A2, then D12, then EE4, etc.).

1.502 MARKER REMOVAL: All markers/counters listed below are removed from the map at this time (Right of Inspection does not apply to revealed stacks):
- a) SR, FFE, and FPF Barrage counters;
- b) SMOKE counters;
- c) Acquired counters;
- d) DM, Disrupted, Fanatic, Berserk, and HD markers, Dummy Stacks, Dummy Cloaking Counters, and “x”;
- e) CX, Motion, CE, BU, and Labor markers;
- f) all hidden/Cloaked units, entrenchments and Equipment are placed on-map in their present Location (other still-hidden Fortifications need not be revealed at this time).
- g) Sniper counters.
1.503 RALLY: All currently broken units of both sides automatically rally, even if Disrupted. No DR are made. When RePh step 1.503 has been completed, CG-Scenario End has occurred.

1.504 ENCIRCLEMENT, BOG AND SHOCK

ENCIRCLEMENT: Each encircled unit [EXC: Prisoner] must take a separate ITC (leadership DRM may apply if present and at owner’s choice). If it passes its ITC it remains in its current Location (Encircled markers are not removed until 1.5062). Failing the ITC results in the unit’s immediate Elimination [EXC: Encircled PRC of an Immobile vehicle are Eliminated, leaving the vehicle Abandoned]. Each prisoner that an Eliminated Encircled unit was Guarding must, if possible, be claimed by another unit in that Location friendly to the eliminated unit. If the prisoner is not claimed, it is considered re-armed (A20,551) and may automatically possess any Equipment dropped by its Eliminated Guard. Otherwise, any Equipment that an Eliminated Encircled unit possessed is left unpossessed in the Location.

BOG: Each non-Abandoned, bogged/stranded vehicle must undergo ≥ one Bog Removal attempt (D8.3) until it is either unbogged or immobilized (MP expenditure is immaterial).

SHOCK/UK: Each Shocked/UK AFV must undergo ≥ one recuperation attempt (C7.42) until either the marker is removed or the AFV is eliminated.

1.505 SETUP AREA DETERMINATION: Each side now determines its Setup Area(s) for the next CG scenario.

Each side may, at any time during/after a CG scenario, place a friendly Location Control marker in a Strategic Location that it currently Controls, especially if that Location’s Control might become disputed at some later point. A Control marker must be removed (or flipped) if the Controlling side loses Control of that Location. A non-Strategic Location may still be Controlled (as per A26.11.12) but does not receive a Control Marker.

A Setup Area may currently contain no units, but can still have friendly units Shifted into it unless it is Isolated.

1.5051 NO-MAN’S LAND: As each side determines its Setup Area(s), there will be portions of the map where two opposing Setup Areas overlap. A non-Strategic Location within two hexes of both friendly and enemy-Controlled Strategic Locations is a No-Man’s Land hex. A No-Man’s Land hex can never be part of a Setup Area. A Strategic Location can never be No-Man’s Land (though it can be Isolated). Each manned, Immobile vehicle without functioning MA in No-Man’s Land becomes Abandoned, and its crew (if any) must attempt Escape per 1.506. See also 1.5056 and 1.5072.

1.5052 ISOLATED UNIT: An Isolated unit/Weapon is one in a friendly Setup Area Location from which that unit (or, for a Weapon only, a hypothetical Infantry MMC) would be unable to trace a path of contiguous, Enterable, Uncontrolled-Territory/friendly-Setup-Area Locations to an Eligible Entry Area. See 1.506 for Escape requirements, 1.52321 for Setup restrictions and penalties. See also 1.5056.

1.5053 UNCONTROLLED TERRITORY: Uncontrolled Territory refers collectively to all hexes that are neither No-Man’s Land nor part of either side’s Setup Area. Each Personnel/Mobile-vehicle unit, and its portaged/possessed/towed Equipment, in an Uncontrolled Territory hex at Scenario end, is Retained into the nearest friendly Setup Area, even if Isolated [EXC: ignore any Isolated Setup Area which would result in overstocking], or into the nearest Eligible Entry Area. ‘Nearest’ is defined as along the shortest path of contiguous, Enterable, Uncontrolled Territory hexes, unit owner’s choice of Area if equivistant. Each Personnel/Mobile-vehicle unit unable to trace such a path is required to attempt Escape (1.506). Each Immobile vehicle without functioning MA becomes Abandoned, and its crew (if any) is then either Retained (if it can trace such a path) or required to attempt Escape. See also 1.5056.

1.5054 SURROUNDED HEXES: Each Uncontrolled Territory hex, and each unoccupied Strategic Location that is currently completely enclosed within a Setup Area of only one side becomes part of that Setup Area [EXC: a Location vacated later due to the Escape of an enemy unit; 1.5051].

1.5055 IN FRIENDLY SETUP AREA: Each unit/Equipment currently in a friendly Setup Area is Retained therein.

1.5056 NOT IN FRIENDLY SETUP AREA: Use the chart (below) to determine what happens to on-map units/Equipment that do not end a CG scenario non-Isolated inside a friendly Setup Area. Note that the actions listed are to be carried out in order according to the RePh sequence.

Personnel/Mobile Vehicle:

- in enemy Setup Area must attempt Escape (1.506)
- in No Man’s Land must attempt Escape (1.506)
- in Uncontrolled Territory is Retained into the nearest friendly Setup Area/Eligible Entry Area or must attempt Escape (1.506)

Abandoned but otherwise Mobile Vehicle or Unpossessed Non-Vehicle Equipment other than Functioning Gun:

- in enemy Setup Area is Captured or Eliminated (enemy’s choice; 1.5071)*
- in No Man’s Land is left in place unpossessed (1.5072)
- in Uncontrolled Territory is left in place unpossessed (1.5072)
- if Isolated is Retained by the Controlling side (1.5071)

Crewed, Immobile Vehicle without Functioning MA:

- in enemy Setup Area is Captured or Eliminated (enemy’s choice; 1.5071)*
- in No Man’s Land is Abandoned; the crew (if any) must attempt Escape (1.5051)†
- in Uncontrolled Territory is Abandoned (1.5053); the crew (if any) is in Uncontrolled Territory Retained into the nearest friendly Setup Area/Eligible Entry Area or must attempt Escape (1.5053)†
- if Isolated is Retained by the Controlling side (1.5071)

Crewed, Immobile Vehicle with Functioning MA—or Manually Functioning Gun

- in enemy-controlled Strategic Location hex is Captured or Eliminated (enemy’s choice; 1.5071)*
- in any other Location becomes a Strategic Location

*Capturing/Eliminating side may attempt to scrounge allowed Weapon(s) and/or turn vehicle into (Burnt-Out) wreck.
† Abandoning crew may turn vehicle into (Burnt-Out) wreck.

1.506 ESCAPE: Each Personnel/Mobile-vehicle unit ending a scenario in No-Man’s Land, or in an enemy Setup Area, or in Uncontrolled Territory from which it is required to attempt Escape (1.5053) must attempt Escape. Each Personnel/Mobile-vehicle unit ending a scenario Isolated may attempt Escape [EXC: Overstocked units must attempt Escape or be moved to another non-Overstacked Location in the same Isolated Setup Area]. If > one Personnel unit in the same Location wishes to Escape,
they may combine into one or more stacks; each stack then makes its own DR on the Escape Table. When attempting to Escape, each MMC may portage ≤ five PP and each SMC may portage ≤ two PP (*EXC: a wounded SMC can portage nothing*). Each squad stacked with a leader may freely Deploy. Prior to its possessor’s Escape attempt, each SW/Gun may (must if the unit exceeds its allowed portage limit) be dropped or freely Eliminated/Transferred/dismantled-if-otherwise-possible. A non-dm Gun can never Escape.

**ESCAPE TABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final DR</th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Mobile Vehicle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤ 8</td>
<td>Escapes 1</td>
<td>Escapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Escapes; Replaced 1</td>
<td>Abandoned; 4-5 crew (if any) Escapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Escapes; Casualty Reduced 3</td>
<td>Eliminated; 6 crew (if any) Escapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Escapes; Replaced, then Casualty Reduced 2</td>
<td>Abandoned; 5 crew (if any) Eliminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 12</td>
<td>All units and Equipment Eliminated</td>
<td>Eliminated; crew (if any) Eliminated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. An Original 2 DR results in Escape and Heat of Battle for an eligible unit (A15); use Random Selection to determine the unit(s) affected in a stack. (*EXC: Any result other than Hero-Creation/Battle Hardening results in Elimination of the unit(s).*

2. A crew, or unit that would become Disrupted, is Eliminated instead.

3. Use Random Selection for a stack.

4. The surviving crew (if any) may attempt to Scourge the vehicle/wreck.

5. The surviving crew (if any) may attempt to Scourge the vehicle prior to its Elimination.

**DRM:**

- 1 if lone, unwounded SMC
- 1 if CT AFV
- 1 if current CG Date is Night
- 2 if adjacent to (-1 if two hexes away from) a non-ignorable Friendly Setup Area

+a (Armor-)Leader/ Hero DRM (NA to Personnel Leader/ Hero if alone)

+1 if in enemy Setup Area, or if it must trace a path through ≥ one enemy Setup Area to intended Area of Retention

+1 per HS-equivalent > one HS using the same Escape DR

+1 per PP > IPC being carried (unit with most excess PP determines this DRM for a stack; a stacked Leader may combine to increase a MMC’s IPC)

+1 if unarmed or Wounded

+1 if a Captured vehicle

+1 if stunned

+2 if Encircled

+2 if Isolated

*NA to vehicle Escape attempt.

**1.5061 ESCAPE RESULTS:** If a unit survives the Escape attempt, it and all Equipment it took with it are Retained into a Friendly Setup Area or off-map at an Eligible Entry Area—whichever is nearest in a path of contiguous, Entearable, Uncontrolled-Territory/No-Man’s-Land/enemy-Setup-Area Locations (Escape’s choice if ≥ two such Areas are equidistant, but always using as few enemy Setup Area Locations as possible)

[EXC: ignore any Isolated Setup Area which would result in overstocking.]

If a unit is Eliminated by the Escape attempt, all Equipment it took with it is Eliminated on a subsequent dr of ≥ 4; on a dr of ≤ 3 the Equipment is left in the Eliminated unit’s last occupied Location. See also 1.5131.

**1.5062 ENCRICLED MARKER REMOVAL:** All Encircled markers are now removed.

**1.507 EQUIPMENT POSSESSION AND HIDDEN FORTIFICATIONS**

**1.5071 IN SETUP AREA:** Each piece of Equipment in a Setup Area is Retained (as Captured, if applicable) therein by the side Controlling that Setup Area. At its (new) owner’s option, each such non-vehicle piece may be Eliminated by any Personnel (even an Abandoning crew) Retained in that Setup Area, and each such vehicle may be Abandoned, etc. exactly as per 1.51423. The Inherent crew of each now-Captured Immobile vehicle with no functioning MA is also Captured. Each Unpossessed/Abandoned Equipment piece in a Setup Area may remain Unpossessed/Abandoned (in which case it retains its current CA) or may automatically be Repossessed/remanned and operated (as per A21.11.13, A21.21.22, D5.42 and D6.63) by Personnel Retained in that Setup Area. Each Immobile vehicle must remain in its present Location and VCA until such time as it becomes Mobile.

**1.5072 NOT IN SETUP AREA:** All Unpossessed/Abandoned Equipment in No Man’s Land or Uncontrolled Territory must remain in its present Location (and vehicle/Gun CA) until Eliminated or Repossessed/re mannied in (or after; 1.5071) a subsequent scenario. Each Immobile vehicle must remain in its present location and VCA until such time as it becomes Mobile.

**1.5073 HIDDEN FORTIFICATIONS:** Each still-hiddenFortification within a Setup Area of the purchaser’s opponent is placed on-map. Each on-map Fortification (i.e., from a previous scenario) is controlled by the side (if any) controlling its Location.

**1.508 PRISONERS:** Each prisoner guarded by a non-Isolated unit is Eliminated. An Isolated Guard Guard may maintain possession of his prisoner(s), freely transfer them to another friendly unit (capable of being a Guard) in the same Isolated Area, or free them or, if the guard is Japanese, Massacred them. If freed, a prisoner is automatically Retained (by the side friendly to it) into the nearest (in shortest path of contiguous Entearable Locations) friendly Setup/ Eligible Entry Area (of the Unarmed unit side’s choice if ≥ 2 such Areas are equidistant) (*EXC: Ignore any Isolated Setup Area which would result in overstocking*). An unarmed Japanese MMC is Replaced by a Conscript MMC of the same size (see G17.4 for Marine MMC); a freed SMC is Replaced by the original SMC type.

**1.509 EXTINGUISHING FLAMES AND BLAZES:** Players must remove each Flame/Blaze counter and make the appropriate counter changes and Eliminations when performing the following sub-steps:

**1.5091 BURNING WRECK:** Each Burning Wreck has its Blaze marker removed. Replace the wreck with a Burnt-Out Wreck.

**1.5092 ELIMINATIONS:** All Isolated units/Equipment that would have been confined to setting up in Locations from which a terrain flame/Blaze has just been removed are Eliminated.
1.510 WOUNDED LEADERS: Each side makes a dr on the following table for each currently wounded Retained Leader:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final dr</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤ 1</td>
<td>Retained unwounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>Retained wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 5</td>
<td>Eliminated (evacuated)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drm:
- +1 if Isolated
- -1 if Heroic

1.511 RECOMBINING AND BATTLE HARDENING

1.5111 RECOMBINING: All Retained same-type HS within the same Setup/Entry Area must now Recombine (A1.32) so that no more than one of each HS type is Retained in that Area (EXC: each side may retain one HS per SW MTR Retained even if that SW is currently malfunctioned).

1.5112 HEROES & MMC: On each side, each Retained Hero (EXC: Heroic Leader; 1.5113) is Eliminated; however, each such Elimination enables that side to Battle Harden one non-crew MMC of the owner's choice within the same Setup/Entry Area as that hero (EXC: if no MMC are available to Battle Harden, the hero is Retained in that Setup/Entry Area). Elite MMC that Battle Harden become Fanatic for the duration of the next CG Scenario (only, even if it is an Idle Date). No MMC may Battle Harden more than once per RePh.

1.5113 LEADERS: On each side, each Retained Heroic leader Battle Hardens and loses his heroic status (EXC: a heroic 10-3 (Marine)/10-2 (Japanese) loses his heroic status with no additional effect).

1.512 NEW CG DATE AND SAN ADJUSTMENT

1.5121 NEW CG DATE: Each passage of this RePh step represents the start of a new CG Date.

1.5122 SAN ADJUSTMENT: Each side must determine if the SAN of their side must be reduced for the current CG Date. A side whose SAN is currently ≤ 2 has it automatically raised to 2 (no CPP expenditure is necessary). If a SAN is ≥ 4, a SAN adjustment dr must be made with a +drm equal to the current SAN minus 4. A Final dr ≥ 5 immediately reduces that side's SAN by two.

1.513 SHIFT: A Personnel/Mobile-vehicle unit (or group of such) Retained in a Setup Area may attempt to Shift to another friendly Setup Area or Eligible Entry Area. A Personnel unit (or group of such) Retained in an Entry Area may attempt to Shift to the next Eligible Entry Area, or to a non-Isolated friendly Setup Area. A unit/group that wishes to Shift from a Setup Area must be able to trace a path (of any length) of contiguous, Enterable (by all units of the shifting group), Uncontrolled-Territory/friendly Setup Area/Eligible Entry Area hexes from any friendly Controlled hex of that Setup Area to any hex of the Area to which it is attempting to Shift.

Each MMC may portage ≤ 5PP and each SMC may portage ≤ 2 PP (EXC: a wounded SMC can portage nothing). Prior to its possessor's Shift (attempt), each SW may (must if the unit exceeds its allowed portage limit) be dropped or freely Eliminated/Transferred/dismantled-if-possible. A non-dm Gun cannot be Shifted. Each squad possessing > 5PP and stacked with a leader may freely Deploy when attempting to shift.

Make a separate Secret DR on the following table for each unit/group attempting to Shift (EXC: no DR is required if a unit/group Retained in a Setup Area wishes to Shift to an Eligible Entry Area that is part of adjacent to that Setup Area (it is automatically successful in this case)). Only one Shift attempt may be made per unit/group per CG Date, and all units attempting to Shift from the same, and to the same new, Entry or Setup Area must do so as a single group.

SHIFT TABLE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final DR</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤ 8</td>
<td>Shifted safely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10</td>
<td>No Shift*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Shifted with Casualties†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 12</td>
<td>All units, Inherent Crews and Equipment Eliminated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drm:
- -1 if that entire path can be traced on road/path/open-ground hexes
- +1 per every five Uncontrolled-Territory hexes along that path between the current Setup/Entry Area and the desired new Setup/Entry Area

* Unit/group cannot Shift—it may not attempt to Shift again until the next CG date, and must remain in its current Entry Area (if Retained off-map) or Setup Area (if Retained on-map), though it may otherwise participate normally in the next CG Scenario.
† Each Personnel unit suffers Casualty Reduction on a subsequent dr ≥ 4. Each vehicle is Eliminated on a subsequent dr ≥ 4; if it is Eliminated, make a CS DR for its Inherent crew (if any; Casualty Reduction is NA). Roll separately for each unit.

1.5131 VACATED SETUP AREA: If the last unit in a friendly Setup Area is Eliminated or successfully Escapes/ShifShifts elsewhere, each Location of that Setup Area remains Controlled by the last Controlling (i.e., by the vacating) side.

1.514 EQUIPMENT REPAIR AND REPLENISHMENT

1.5141 VEHICLES: Each side performs the applicable step(s) below for each vehicle in a friendly Setup/Eligible Entry Area.

a) ABANDONED: Each Abandoned vehicle may remain Abandoned, or may be reconditioned and operated (per A21.22 or D5.42/D6.631) by Personnel Retained within the same Setup Area.

b) IMMOBILIZATION REPAIR: Each non-Captured, non-Abandoned, Immobilized vehicle must make a dr on the following table to determine if the immobilization is required:

IMMOBILIZATION REPAIR TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final dr</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤ 2</td>
<td>Becomes Mobile*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 3</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drm:
- +1 if Isolated
- +1 if only Non-Qualified Use (A21.13) possible
- +1 if in a Front Line hex

*And is Retained in its current Setup Area.
**RECALL**
-2 if Recall is Complete
-1 if under Recall

**STUNNED**
-1 if Retained

1.5142 WEAPON REPAIR: Each side now makes a separate dr on the table below for each malfunctioned, non-Captured, Retained Weapon in each friendly Setup/Entry Area that contains Personnel (or, for a vehicular Weapon, an Inherent crew in that vehicle):

### WEAPON REPAIR TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final dr</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤ 1</td>
<td>Repaired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 2</td>
<td>Eliminated*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* If vehicular-mounted, the Weapon is Disabled; if MA, the AFV is immediately Recalled (1.5141c applies).

1.51421 VEHICULAR MG EXCHANGE: A Disabled, non-Captured, vehicular MG may be automatically repaired (even if Disabled in step 1.5142) by Eliminating a friendly SW MMG. In all cases, the MG to be Eliminated must be Retained within the same Setup/Entry Area as the AFV.

1.51422 CAPTURED EQUIPMENT: Each side makes a separate dr for each functioning, Captured, Retained Weapon in each friendly Setup/Entry area that contains Personnel; if ≥ 4 it is Eliminated (Disabled if vehicular). Each already malfunctioned Captured Weapon is Eliminated (Disabled if vehicular). Disablement of MA by either means does not cause Recall. At its captor’s option, a Captured vehicle may remain in play if it has any functioning weapon (even if MA is Disabled); otherwise it is turned into a (Burnt-Out) wreck as per 1.51423.

1.51423 ABANDONING, SCOURING & REMOVAL: At the Controlling player’s option ≥ one non-Recalled-vehicle/non-Burnt-Out Wreck in each friendly Setup Area may be Abandoned and/or turned into a (Burnt-Out) wreck. Likewise, he may attempt to Scourge ≥ one non-Recalled-vehicle/non-Burnt-Out-wreck in each friendly Setup Area [EXC to all; described actions are NA unless there are Retained Personnel unit(s) in that Setup Area, including an Abandoning crew.]

1.51424 SPECIAL AMMO: Each non-Captured, non-Isolated weapon which has some form of depleted ammunition type is automatically replenished.

1.515 REINFORCEMENTS: Each RG listed in each side’s RG Chart has one or more Eligible-Entry-Area(s)/Setup-Area(s) listed. The reinforcements entering the map this CG Date must enter/set-up via one of the listed Entry-Area/Setup Areas. All, some or none may enter on any turn (i.e., it doesn’t require pre-designation). If reinforcements remain off-map at the CG-Scenario-End, they are Retained until the next CG Scenario. Regardless of when they actually enter the CG, they may only enter/set-up as specified.

1.516 CPP REPLENISHMENT: CPP are replenished according to the following formula: the CPP Base Number (see below) plus a secret dr equals the final amount of CPP replenished.

1.5161 CPP BASE NUMBER: Each side’s CPP Base Number is given below for the current CG Date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CG Date</th>
<th>LJA CPP Base #</th>
<th>USMC CPP Base #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Sept Night</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sept Day</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sept Night I</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sept Night II</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Sept Day</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5162 For each scenario after the Initial scenario, both sides secretly roll one dr and add the result to the CPP Base # for the date about to be played.

1.517 WEATHER DETERMINATION: EC, Weather, Moon Phase, and Cloud Cover are taken from either of the following tables, depending on whether players choose Historical Weather or Random Weather:

### HISTORICAL WEATHER CHART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CG Date</th>
<th>EC</th>
<th>Weather</th>
<th>Moon Phase</th>
<th>Cloud Cover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Sept Night</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Scattered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sept Day</td>
<td>Moist</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sept Night I</td>
<td>Moist</td>
<td>Overcast</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Overcast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sept Night II</td>
<td>Moist</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Scattered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Sept Day</td>
<td>Moist</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### RANDOM WEATHER CHART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final DR</th>
<th>EC</th>
<th>Weather</th>
<th>Moon Phase</th>
<th>Cloud Cover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>Moist</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8</td>
<td>Moist</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Scattered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>Moist</td>
<td>Overcast</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Overcast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 12</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>Overcast</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Overcast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Raining at Start and through first Game Turn regardless of WC DR.
* +1 DR if previous CG Date was Overcast.

1.518 PURCHASING REINFORCEMENT GROUPS: The players now secretly allot CPP for the purchase of RG. All CPP expended are
### U.S. REINFORCEMENT GROUP CHART (i)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Group Type</th>
<th>Full/ Depl</th>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>CPP Cost</th>
<th>CG Date Max</th>
<th>CG Max</th>
<th>Entry Area</th>
<th>LMG</th>
<th>MMG</th>
<th>HMG</th>
<th>.50 cal</th>
<th>L.L. MTR</th>
<th>DC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Raider Rifle Pltn</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>558 (ER7)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Parachute Rifle Pltn</td>
<td>3/2; 2/1</td>
<td>558 (ER8)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Parachute Demo Pltn</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Marine Rifle Pltn</td>
<td>3/2; 1/0</td>
<td>458; 558</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I5</td>
<td>Marine Pioneer Pltn (b)</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Area 2</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)*</td>
<td>(1)*</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I6</td>
<td>Marine Engineer Pltn</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Area 3</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(1)*</td>
<td>(1)*</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW1</td>
<td>Raider Weapons Pltn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1x238 HS per SW received (ER7)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW2</td>
<td>Raider MG Pltn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1x238 HS per SW received (ER7)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW3</td>
<td>Raider MR Pltn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1x238 HS per SW received (ER7)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW4</td>
<td>Marine Wpn Pltn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1x448 HS per SW received</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Notes:
- a) May only be purchased for on-map or Reserve setup.
- b) Purchase of this RG has an impact on CG VC.
- c) Automatically comes with either a radio or field phone—player's choice
- d) May only be purchased if selecting Attack Initiative for the scenario about to be played.
- e) May only be purchased if selecting Idle Initiative for the scenario about to be played.
- f) After purchasing, make a dr. On a dr ≥ 4 this RG is equipped with M3 LT, otherwise equipped with M2A4 LT.
- g) Maximum of two pre-registered hexes per OBA module purchased.
- h) May fire SMOKE.
- i) See 1.5182 for SW allocation
- * Purchasing player rolls for both the HMG and the .50cal, but may receive only one (owner's choice).
- † See CG 7

**NOTE:** Only RG "I1-I3", "HW1-HW3", "O1-O2", and "M1" are available for purchase on the 12 Sept N CG Date. Unless cumulative U.S. losses are ≥ 19 CVP, this restriction remains in effect until the 13 Sept N CG Date.

The RG chart contains the following columns:

1. **1.5181 ID:** Alphanumeric identification for each RG.
2. **1.5182 GROUP TYPE:** Lists the name of the RG. This name and its ID are secretly recorded on player's RG Purchase Record (1.5188).
3. **1.5183 (FULL/DEPL.) UNIT TYPE:** Lists the numbers and type(s) of units that each RG contains.
4. **1.5184 CPP COST:** Lists the CPP cost of the RG (regardless of its later determined strength). This is the number of CPP that must be subtracted from the player's current CPP total in order to receive that RG.
5. **1.5185 CG DATE MAX:** Lists the maximum number of RG of this type that may be purchased this CG Date.
6. **1.5186 CG MAXIMUM:** Lists the maximum number of RG of this type that may be purchased during the course of the CG. Both players must keep a written record of each RG purchased during the CG in order to know if additional RG of that type are still available for purchase. RG given during the CG Initial Scenario do not count against these maximums.
### Japanese Reinforcement Group Chart (i)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Group Type</th>
<th>Full/Depl</th>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>CPP Cost</th>
<th>CG Date Max</th>
<th>CG Max</th>
<th>Entry Area</th>
<th>LG</th>
<th>MG</th>
<th>HHG</th>
<th>LL MTR</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>FT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>IIA Rifle Pltn</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>A,B,C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>IIA Engineer Pltn</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>A,B,C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>IIA Lost Bn Rifle Pltn (e)</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HW1</td>
<td>IIA Wpns Pltn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1×228 per SW received</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>A,B,C</td>
<td>2(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW2</td>
<td>IIA Lost Bn Wpns Pltn (e)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1×228 per SW received</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>2(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>Grn Gun Sect (e.g.)</td>
<td>2×70 INF</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>A,B,C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>Rgt AT Sect (e.g.)</td>
<td>2×Type 94 37L AT</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>A,B,C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>O1</td>
<td>Grn Gun Support (a.f)</td>
<td>70×mm OBA Module</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O2</td>
<td>Pre-Registration (d)</td>
<td></td>
<td>pre-registered hex</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>O3</td>
<td>Offboard Observer (b)</td>
<td>Level 4 Offboard Observer</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O4</td>
<td>Bombardment (c)</td>
<td></td>
<td>pre-game bombardment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>Air Support</td>
<td>1-3 FB '42</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>Fortifications</td>
<td>15 FPP</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Recon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Attack Chit(b)</td>
<td>02</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>SAN Increase</td>
<td>Increase SAN by 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

a) Automatically comes with a radio unless an offboard observer was purchased for this module.

b) Offboard Observers are always located along the South Map edge at Level 4.

c) May only be purchased if selecting Attack Initiative for the scenario about to be played.

d) Maximum of two pre-registered hexes per OBA module purchased.

e) Purchase of this RG has an impact on CG VC.

#### 1.5187 ENTRY AREA: Eligible Entry Area(s) or notes for that RG.

**1.5188 RG PURCHASE RECORD:** After all RG for the current CG Date have been selected and CPP expended for them, the RG Purchase Record must be updated. One line of this sheet must be filled out for each RG purchased in order to keep track of the number purchased thus far in the CG. If preparing for a CG Initial Scenario, one line is also filled out for each RG given in the Initial Scenario OB (but these latter do not apply towards CG maximums). The following listing explains how each column of the RG Purchase Record is used.

**CG Date:** The CG scenario the RG is purchased (EX: "12Sept-Night")

**RG ID:** The RG’s alphanumeric ID (EX: H1 for USMC Raider Platoon)

**Group Type:** The RG’s name (EX: "Engineer Platoon")

**#P (Number Purchased):** The total number of friendly RG of this Group Type purchased thus far during the CG.

**#R (Number Remaining):** The number of this RG Group Type still available for subsequent purchase in the CG. This number is derived by subtracting the number in that RG’s #P column from the number listed in the “Maximum” column (for that RG) in the purchasing side’s RG Chart.

**Str:** The RG’s strength, as determined in RePh step 1.5191. Record “F” for a Full or “D” for a Depleted RG.

**# Units:** The number of units received in that RG of the Unit Type listed in the respective RG Chart (e.g., 3 for a Full Strength Paramarine Platoon) and the unit type.

---

f) Module may fire one (1) concentration of WP per CG scenario played.

g) RG includes one 2-2-8 Infantry Crew per weapon.

h) Purchase of an Attack chit on Day CG Dates costs 2 CPP, otherwise Attack chits are free to the IIA player.

i) See 1.5192 for SW allocation.

† See CG 7.

**NOTE:** Only RG "11-12", "HW1", "O1-O2", "M1 & M4" are available for purchase on the 12 Sept CG Date.

**SW Received:** As each SW for that RG is determined (RePh step 1.5192), record the number of each Weapon type received.

**Setup Area/Entry ID:** On its CG Date of purchase, each RG (EX: O-, F- and M-type RG) must have a friendly, non-Isolated Setup Area or Eligible Entry Area recorded for it. Use the hex coordinate of each Entry Area’s center (arrow) hex as the ID for that Area.

**Objective Hex:** This column is used to record the objective hex of each I-type RG when it is initially purchased or that of each OB-given I-type RG before the opponent sets-up. See also the 1.2 definition.

#### 1.519 RG STRENGTH, WEAPONS, & LEADERS

**1.5191 RG STRENGTH:** Each "I" and "HW" RG is eligible for Depletion. For each such RG the player has just purchased (as well as for each such RG received in an Initial Scenario (EX: RG given the U.S. in the Initial Scenario)) he must make one DR on the RG Strength Table to determine whether it is received at Full or Depleted Strength. A Full Strength RG receives the number of specified units to the left of the "F", a Depleted RG receives the number of specified units to the right of the "F".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RG Strength Table</th>
<th>Final DR</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤ 9</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 10</td>
<td>Depleted</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
FIRST MATANIKAU

ASL SCENARIO HS1

MATANIKAU VILLAGE, GUADALCANAL, 19 August 1942: After Lt. Col. Frank Goettge’s small reconnaissance patrol was wiped out near Matanikau on August 12th, General Vandegrift ordered a strike against the Japanese concentration in the area. Given the overriding need to protect Henderson Field, it was a week before the Marines felt they could spare three companies of the 5th Marines for Vandegrift’s clearing operation. B Company would lead the attack across the sand bar at the river’s mouth, occupying the Japanese. Meanwhile, L Company would attack from the south, having crossed the river some 1000 yards inland. I Company would land well west of Matanikau at Kokumbona Village to seal off the Japanese escape routes.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:
- The Americans lose two VP for each hut hex they Control at game end.
- Add one American MMG to the initial American OB.

TURN RECORD CHART

Victory Conditions: The Americans win at the end of any Player Turn if they have amassed ≥ 17 VP. The Americans receive one VP for each CVP amassed and lose one VP for each CVP amassed by the Japanese [EXC: Prisoners do not count double]. Additionally, the Americans receive two VP for each hut hex they Control at game end.

SPECIAL RULES:
1. EC are Wet, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect including Light Jungle (G.2). Place overlays as follows: Be2 with 201/202 on 40M10/40M9; Be1 with 101/102 on 52M10/52M9; EF1 on 40L3/L4, OC1 with 100/1002 on 222/223; OC2 with 2001/2002 on 1099/1091; G5 on 40S1/S2; S2 on 40N1/D1; Wd5 on 40T6/S7; Wd4 on 40U8/T8; Wd3 on 40X9/W10; OW1 on 40P4/P5; X29 on 40R6.
2. The river is deep with a moderate Current into the north. All buildings are Huts. No hedges exist. All Level 1 Hills are Level 0. Beach Slope is Slight [EXC: only one shallow ocean hex exists; G13.4].
3. The Matanikau Outpost units may not use HIP. The Matanikau Garrison units may use HIP for ≤ 3 squad-equivalents (including any SMC/SW set up with them), in lieu of their normal (G1.63) HIP allocation.

AFTERMATH: After a dawn bombardment, the Marines attacked. B Company was stopped at the river’s mouth and was unable to advance. L Company, under the command of Captain Lyman Spurlock, had successfully crossed the Matanikau the day before. Their advance ran into a Japanese outpost, which delayed the attack on the village itself until 1400 hours. As the Marines drew near the village, Captain Spurlock heard shouts of “Banzai!”. Deployed around a clearing, the Marines received the charge, killing most of the attackers. Fighting with the remaining defenders raged until 1600 hours when the Marines were finally able to declare the village secured. This action had little effect on the overall campaign, however, other than to provide valuable experience to the Marines.
WAR WITHOUT QUARTER

ASL SCENARIO HS2

TENARU RIVER, Guadalcanal, 21 August 1942: Undaunted by the destruction of his reconnaissance patrol two days earlier, Colonel Ichiki led an attack on the Marine perimeter on the night of 20 August. He expected to brush the defenders aside and advance on Henderson Airfield. However, instead of bolting at the sight of the Japanese, the heavily outnumbered Marines held on and decimated Ichiki's force. By morning, it was obvious that the battle had been lost by the Japanese. Though Ichiki pulled the remnants of his force back to the eastern side of the river, the Marines would give him no reprieve. With the sun came the Marine counterattack.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oc1</th>
<th>Oc2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40 Kfl</td>
<td>35 Be1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be2</td>
<td>Wd2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wd5</td>
<td>Wd3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Americans win at game end by amassing ≥ 30 CVP, provided the Japanese have amassed ≤ 24 CVP.

BALANCE:

- In the Victory Conditions, change "≤ 24" to "≤ 20".
- In the American Turn 1 reinforcement OB, replace the 9-1 with a 9-2.

TURN RECORD CHART

- JAPANESE Sets Up First [251]
- AMERICAN Moves First [326]

Elements of Ichiki Butai [ELR: 3] set up east of the river: {SAN: 5}

Elements of G Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines [ELR: 5] set up west of the river (see SSR 2): {SAN: 3}

Elements of A and B Companies, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines enter on Turn 1 along the south edge east of the river:

Attached Armored Platoon, 1st Marine Division enter on Turn 3 along any Beach hex along the west edge of board 40:

SPECIAL RULES:

1. EC are Wet, with a Mild Breeze from the northwest. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect, including Light Jungle (G.2.1) [EXC: all building hexes are Bamboo]. Walls/Hedges do not exist. Treat all hills/elevated-roads as Level 0 terrain (all non-hill terrain therein exists normally). All Effluent hexes are river hexes [EXC: Vehicles traverse such hexes as if a Stream]. Place overlays as follows: Wd2 on 40Q1/R1; Wd3 on 35V9/U10; Wd5 on 35N9/N8; Be1 on 40G10/G9; Be2 on 35G10/G9; Ef1 on 138/139; Oc1 on 122/123; Oc2 on 1009/1010. Beach Slope is Steep (G13.23). The river is fordable and has no Current.

2. Prior to setup, place a Wire counter in hexes 107 and 117. No American units may use HIP (even if Emplaced).

3. The Americans receive random Air Support (E7) in the form of one '42 FB without bombs. If not already in play, the Air Support automatically arrives on American Player Turn 4.

AFTERMATH: Confident that no further Japanese activity was forthcoming, the Marine reserves counterattacked. Colonel Cates led his 1st Battalion on an intricate maneuver across the river to the south and forced the Japanese survivors back into the Marine positions along the river. The brutal attack left more than 800 Japanese of the Ichiki Butai dead. General Vandegrift would later characterize this battle as "war without quarter."
ASL SCENARIO HS3

TASIMBOKO RAID

TASIMBOKO, GUADELOUPE. 8 September 1942: With the Marines firmly established on Guadalcanal, and with the earlier failure of the Ichiki Detachment at Alligator Creek, the Japanese landed more troops at Tarawa Point, 18 miles east of Henderson Field. The Japanese commander, Major-General Kawaguchi Kiyotake, planned to attack the Marine positions (exceeding his orders to simply reconnoiter the airfield) after having his engineers cut a trail through the dense jungle toward Henderson Field. Native scouts had reported this build up to the Marines, who discounted this information in favor of previous reports indicating only a small Japanese contingent in the Tasimboko area. Colonel Edson was dispatched with the reorganized forces of the 1st Raider Battalion to eliminate this supposedly small enemy force. In the early morning, the first wave of Raiders came ashore at Tarawa Point where they found signs of recent landings. Edson quickly deployed his men to attack with two companies along the coast while a third curved inland to strike the Japanese flank from the south. At mid-morning, the Raiders made contact with defenders near Tasimboko.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:

- Reduce the game length by 1/2 Turn (to 8 Turns).
- In the initial Japanese OB, delete the 37th INF SW and one 2-2-8.

TURN RECORD CHART

- JAPANESE Sets Up First [154]
- AMERICAN Moves First [205]

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | END |

Elements of 35th Infantry Regiment Kawaguchi Force [ELR: 4] set up in Hinterland hexes, between the 37N5-P5-X5-GG6 and 34T5-Q5-P5-J5-H6-A6 paths: [SAN: 5]

Set up in Hinterland hexes with each Gun set up ≤ 2 hexes from ≥ 1 other Gun; all Gun CA must initially be northwest (see SSR 2):

Elements of B and C Companies, 1st Raider Battalion [ELR: 5] enter on Turn 1 along the east edge of board 34: [SAN: 3]

Elements of A Company, 1st Raider Battalion enter on Turn 3 along the west and/or south edge(s) of board 37 on/between o311–37GG6:

SPECIAL RULES:

1. EC are Wet, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect. Beach Slope is Slight (G13.21). Place overlays as follows: G1 on 35P6; Be1 with 101/102 on 34U1/2; Be2 with 201/202 on 35U1/2; Be3 with 301/302 on 37M10/S9; Oc1 with 1001/1002 on 230/231; Oc2 with 2001/2002 on 328/329; Oc3 with 3001/3002 on 322/323; 1 on 35N6/S9; and Oc2 on 35N9/010.

2. Japanese Guns may not be Emplaced [EXC: they may use HIP and gain/lose concealment as if they were Emplaced], may not be sighted, and may not change CA until they have LOS to ≥ 1 enemy unit. Japanese 4-4-8x2-3-8s are Assault Engineers (H.122).

3. The Americans receive Air Support, which automatically arrives on American Player Turn 4, in the form of one FI without bombs. All American units are stealthy.

AFTERMATH: As the bulk of Kawaguchi Force continued westward, a half-company of infantry and a lighter of field guns remained to meet the Marine raid. Soon the Marines felt the concussion of massed bursts against their faces and heard the telltale "fairy whistle" of shells as the guns fired from point blank range. The field pieces had just arrived the previous night and were set to face expected attacks from the Marine positions to the west. Their initial bursts killed two Marines and severely wounded a third. Despite this initial shock, the Raiders pressed their attack into the Japanese positions. Having flanked the enemy, A Company burst upon the Japanese from the rear leaving clumps of defenders sprawled about the field pieces and machine guns. By 1230 hours, opposition came to an end and Edson's men entered Tasimboko to find it deserted. By 1700, Edson had his command re-embarked.

This most successful raid cost two Marines killed and six wounded; Japanese dead numbered twenty-seven.
HIGH WATER MARK

ASL SCENARIO HS4

LUNGA RIDGE, GUADALCANAL, 13 September 1942: Col. Kawaguchi’s men were pressing the Marines on the ridge as hard as they could. Naturally, the action was confused and communications on both sides were poor. A large component of the II Battalion, 4th Regiment IJA had moved up to a staging area south of the Marine line and was waiting there for orders. Marine artillery began falling on them, leading their commander, Major Tanuma, to launch an attack rather than take more fire. He sent the 7th Company first, followed by the 8th Company. On the east side of the ridge, B Company Paramarines were pulling back—leaving B Company Raiders vulnerable on three sides. Col. Edson organized a new defensive position on the Battalion Reserve Line with C Company Raiders and A Company Paramarines and ordered B Company Raiders to fall back. They would make their stand on the northern hill, the last defensive position between the Japanese and the prized airfield.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:
- Add one Raider 5-5-8 to the Turn 5 U.S. reinforcement OB.
- The Japanese reinforcements enter on Turn 1.

TURN RECORD CHART

Victory Conditions: Provided they Control ≥ 2 Level 4 hexes of Hill 120, the Japanese win at game end by amassing ≥ 26 Victory Points. The Japanese receive 3 VP for each Level 4 hex of Hill 120 they Control, and 2 VP for each Good Order Japanese squad-equivalent (1 VP for each HS/crew) exited off the north edge.

Special Rules:
1. EC are Moist, with no wind at Start. PTO Terrain is in effect (G.1). See ER SSR. All American leaders are Stealthy.
2. Night rules (E.1) are in effect. Base NVR is 2 hexes with Overcast Clouds and a Full Moon. The Americans are the Scenario Defender and the Japanese are the Scenario Attacker. Despite setting up on map, all Japanese units may use Cloaking. The Majority Squad Type for both sides is Normal. The Friendly Board Edge for the Americans is the north edge, while the south and west edges are Friendly Board Edges for the Japanese.
3. The Americans receive one module of 100+mm OBA (HE and SMOKE).
4. The Japanese receive one module of 80+mm Battalion Mortar OBA (HE Only).

AFTERMATH: The hard pressed Raiders of B Company managed to fall back to the Battalion Reserve Line under a protective curtain of artillery fire. The Marine position was bent around the peak like a horse-shoe under the relentless assaults. Col. Edson moved his command post to within 20 yards of the front line, urging his men to hold on, telling those who were ready to bolt, “Get back up there! The only thing they’ve got that you don’t is guts!” Making up for a shortage of ground troops, five artillery battalions of the 11th Marines fired a record number of rounds in support of the beleaguered Marines. After stopping the second massive Japanese attack, Edson was able to report that he was ‘out of the woods’.
**VICTORY CONDITIONS:** The Americans win at game end if they control hexes M3, N1, N7, O4, and O5.

**BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

**BALANCE:**
- Add one 2-3-7 HS and one Japanese LMG to the Japanese OB.
- No Japanese units may use HIP.

**TURN RECORD CHART**

- JAPANESE Sets Up First
- AMERICAN Moves First [0]

**Elements of III Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment [ELR: 4]** set up on/south-of hex row T in hexes numbered ≤ 9: [SAN: 5]

- 4: 4-7
- 2: 2-8
- 1: 1-8
- 0: 0-8
- MTO: 4-11
- 5-8: 5-8
- 2-9:
- MTO: 4-10

**Elements of A & D Companies, 1st Raider Battalion [ELR: 5]** enter on Turn 1 along the north edge: [SAN: 3]

**Elements of A Company, 1st Para-Marine Battalion** enter on Turn 2 along the east edge:

**SPECIAL RULES:**
1. EC are Moist, with no wind at Start. See ER SSR.
2. Place a 1S Foxhole counter in hexes M3, N1, N7, O4, and O5.

**AFTERMATH:** The Marines encountered stiff resistance and heavy sniper fire, causing them to halt and re-direct their attack from the east. Despite making progress against the enemy positions, the attack was called off—Colonel Edson had decided to pull the entire Marine line back in preparation for the attack he rightly guessed would come later that night.
VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Americans win immediately upon amassing ≥ 20 VP more than the Japanese. The Americans receive Exit VP for units (excluding Prisoners) which exit off the south edge on/between hexes DD12-DD18. The Japanese receive Exit VP for units (excluding Prisoners) which exit off the north edge on/between hexes SS8-SS11.

LUNGA RIDGE, GUADALCANAL, 14 September 1942: The Japanese 4th Regiment had pushed the Marine Raiders and Paramarines nearly to the breaking point. The defense on Lunga Ridge had been severely stretched, but it hadn’t broken and had extracted a heavy toll on the attacking Japanese troops. While the Japanese were still scattered and had not yet regrouped. General Vandegrift committed the Marine reserves and ordered a counterattack to disrupt Japanese efforts at renewing their assault. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment moved out and arrived at Lunga Ridge just before sunrise. Moving alongside the road leading to the center of the Marine defensive positions, the 2nd Battalion ran into an enemy force squarely astride their axis of advance.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:
- SSR 3 and SSR 4 are NA.
- In the Victory Conditions, change “≥ 20” to “≥ 17”.

TURN RECORD CHART


Elements of G Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines [ELR: 5] enter on Turn 1 along the north edge on/between hexes SS10-SS13: [SAN: 2]

Enter on Turn 1 along the north edge on/between hexes SS6-SS9:

SPECIAL RULES:
1. EC are Wet, with no wind at start. See ER SSR.
2. Turns 1–5 are played using the NVR restrictions of E1.1-1.6 [EXC: NVR change (E1.12) is NA]. Base NVR is 3 hexes during Turns 1 and 2; 4 hexes during Turns 3 and 4; 5 hexes during Turn 5. No NVR restrictions apply after Turn 5. All other Night Rules are NA [EXC: Gunflashes (E1.8)].
3. No Japanese units may use HIP.
4. Bore Sighting is NA.

AFTERMATH: While passing quickly around the knoll in two columns—one on each side—the Marines made unexpected contact with the enemy. Intelligence reports had indicated that the area was free of Japanese forces, but the tenacity of the just-encountered infantry clearly showed they were more than just a random patrol. Intent on reaching their objectives, the Marine columns fought their way through the blocking force, suffering some 50 casualties as they did so. The Japanese stubbornly fought to delay the advance, but gradually gave way to the determined Marines. Later that same day, the remnants of this blocking force would launch a desperate attack in an attempt to break up the American defense on Lunga Ridge. The attackers would be stopped cold by a flight of fighters from Henderson Field—testament to the importance of the airfield to the conquest and defense of Guadalcanal.
WE KNOW WHERE THEY ARE

ASL SCENARIO HS7

LUNGA POINT, GUADALCANAL, 14 September 1942: On the night of September 13th, elements of Major Mizumo's Kuma Battalion attacked the positions held by Marines of the 3rd Battalion on the eastern flank of the American perimeter. The attack quickly overran several listening posts, but failed to break through the main defensive positions. At dawn, the Marines sent a platoon of light tanks on patrol to see if the Japanese had withdrawn. The tanks returned without incident and reported no enemy contact. A short time later, as survivors from the overrun listening posts struggled back to the perimeter, reports of several Japanese positions began to come in. The tanks were dispatched again. They fixed the same path they had taken on their previous patrol—a decision that would prove costly.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:
- One Japanese MMC (and any SMC/SW stacked with it) may use HIP if set up in appropriate terrain.
- SSR 3 is NA.

TURN RECORD CHART

VICTORY CONDITIONS: Provided the Japanese have not eliminated 2-4 AFV (an Abandoned/Immobile/Shocked/Recalled AFV is considered eliminated for VC purposes), the Americans win at game end if there are no Japanese SW possessed by Good Order Japanese Infantry west of the 35A6–35Q6 road depiction, and/or if any combination of 2-3 Japanese crews, Guns, or SW have been eliminated/captured.

TURN RECORD CHART

Elements of Kuma Battalion [ELR: 3] set up east of the 43GG6–43R3 road depiction and west of the 35A6–35Q6 road depiction with no more than one MMC per hex: [SAN: 3]

Regimental Anti-Tank Platoon set up east of the 43GG6–43R3 road depiction with no more than one MMC per hex:

Ad Hoc elements of 1st Tank Company, 1st Tank Battalion enter on Turn 1 along the west edge: [SAN: 0]

SPECIAL RULES:
1. EC are Wet, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect including Light Jungle (G.2). All Marsh/ Swamp is Kunai; no hedges exist. Hexside 35K2/35L1 remains a pond hexside. Place overlays as follows; 81T 35L6-K7; OG5 43U1-T0; OG4 35G3-G2; OG3 35G6-G7. The Stream is shallow (B20.42).
3. Contrary to G1.421, the Japanese may create ≤ 2 T-H Heroes.
4. American AFV are not Recalled due solely to having a disabled MA. American units may exit the west edge of the mapboard at any time without being considered eliminated.

AFTERMATH: Having seen the tanks go by earlier in the day, the Japanese took the time to reposition their two remaining anti-tank guns along the route used by the Marine vehicles. As the armored probe approached, the guns engaged and destroyed three of the M3A1s in rapid succession. A fourth tank was knocked out when it ventured too close to a stream and slid down the bank, overturning in the process. Another tank was immobilized, and the final tank withdrew under fire. The Japanese withdrew once more into the jungle leaving the Marines with a bitter lesson in the use of unsupported armor in the undergrowth.
BAILEY’S DEMISE
ASL SCENARIO HS8

"THE JAP BRIDGE", GUADALCANAL, 26 September 1942: As part of a three-pronged attack against Japanese positions on the western bank of the Matanikau River, the 1st Raider Battalion was to cross the river at a small footbridge. At the same time, elements of the 5th Marines would attack at the river’s mouth, tying down Japanese forces. Finally, half of Chesty Puller’s 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines would be landed west of the Matanikau to encircle the defenders. All of these actions hinged on the Raiders crossing the Matanikau and attacking from the west bank of the river, but none of the Marine planners knew that the Japanese had crossed to the east bank of the river.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:
- In the Japanese OB, replace two 4-4-7s with two 4-4-8s.
- In the Japanese OB, replace two 4-4-7s with two 3-4-7s.

(Victor conditions: The Americans win at game end if there are ≥ 6 CVP of Good Order American Infantry (including at least one leader) west of the river.)

TURN RECORD CHART

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<td><img src="image" alt="Japanese Sets Up First" /></td>
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Elements of 12th Company, 124th Infantry Regiment [ELR: 4] set up on board 34 east of the river in hexes numbered ≥ 3 using HIDE in Concealment Terrain: {SAN: 3}

| ![Army Board](image) |

Elements of 1st Raider Battalion [ELR: 5] enter on Turn 1 along the east edge of board 36: {SAN: 2}

| ![Army Board](image) |

SPECIAL RULES:
1. EC are Moist, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect, including Light Jungle (G.2.1). [Exc: All interior Jungle hexes are Dense Jungle]. All Swamp and Hill hexes are Level 0 Jungle. The Stream is a deep river with a moderate current to the north. [Exc: hexes 54W8, X7, and Y8 are shallow stream hexes]. A footbridge exists in 34V5. Place overlaps as follows: OG1 on 34Y1; OG3 on 34U5/U4; OG2 on 34W6/X5; B3 on 34FF3/FF4; Wd2 on 36G1/G2.
2. No Japanese unit may enter the footbridge hex on Turn 1. Bore Sight is NA.
3. All American units are stealthy.
4. Kindling is NA.

AFTERMATH: The opening burst of fire struck down well liked Major Kenneth Bailey, the Medal of Honor winner for his actions at Bloody Ridge several weeks earlier. Realizing that the Japanese were indeed on the eastern bank, the Marines tried to attack straight through them with little success. Attempts to flank the Japanese position were met with more machine gun fire. The Raiders were repulsed. Radio messages to the rear, however, were interpreted to mean that the Raiders had crossed the river despite the resistance, so the remainder of the Marines plan was set into motion—resulting in near disaster as Chesty Puller’s unit landed amongst the undisturbed Japanese garrison and were nearly cut off and annihilated.
**AMBITIOUS PLANS**

Scenario Design: Brian Youse

**POINT CRUZ, GUADALCANAL, 27 September 1942:** After the series of Bloody Ridge engagements earlier in the month, General Vandegrift knew that a sizable Japanese force was operating from Matanikau village east of Point Cruz. A series of ambitious offensives in regimental strength were planned to clear out the enemy. Forces under the command of Colonel Edson and Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis B. "Cheesy" Puller attacked the Japanese forces from the east, but met with very heavy Japanese resistance. A message sent to Edson led him to mistakenly believe that the Marines were making good progress. In order to exploit this misinterpreted success, Edson sent Cheesey Puller’s 1st Battalion. 7th Marines to land west of Point Cruz and attack Matanikau from the rear supported by fire of the destroyer USS Monsoon. No sooner had the first ridge been gained when two Japanese columns attacked the flanks of the battalion and cut it off from the shore.

**BOARD CONFIGURATION:**

**BALANCE:**

- In the Victory Conditions replace “≥ 35” with “≥ 31”.
- Add one 9-0 leader, one Japanese MMG, and one 2-2-8 crew to the Japanese OB.

**TURN RECORD CHART**

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**TURN RECORD CHART**

**AMERICAN Sets Up First [181]**

**JAPANESE Moves First [135]**

**EVENMEN:**

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- 3
- 5
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- 7
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- 10

**EVENMEN:**

- 1
- 3
- 5
- 6
- 7
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- 9
- 10

**SPECIAL RULES:**

1. EC are Moderate, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect including Light Jungle (G2.1). All Gullies are Paths.
2. Place overlays as follows: OC1 on 39H1-H2; Be4 with hexes 40-1-402 on 37L2-L1; Be5 with 505-502 on 406-405; Be6 with 601-602 on 566-567; OC1 with 1001-1002 on 505-504; OC2 with 2001-2002 on 618-617; and OC3 with 3001-3002 on 677-676. Beach slope is Moderate.
3. Despite the possibility of the Japanese entering play from entirely offshore, the U.S. may not Bore Sight. Contrary to G1.631, the Japanese may not utilize HIP.
4. The U.S. is conducting a Seaborn Evacuation (G1.43). Prior to setup, the U.S. may secretly designate one LC which will load a \(-1\) DRM to any attack using its MA (Land- ing Craft Multi-Applicable Note C). The U.S. receives random Air Support (E7.2), which will consist of one FB armed only with one 4FP MG.
5. The U.S. receives one module of 120-mm NOBA (G14.6; HE and WP) which is directed by the initial U.S. hero; this hero is considered onboard Observer (C1.6) for all purposes, but only if he has LOS to Level 1 of the battery’s pre-designated Ocean hex (G14.62). All NOBA actions conducted by the hero are concealment loss activities. The hero’s Radio Contact value is “8”; radio malfunction and G.7 are NA. Once Contact is gained or maintained, no further Maintenance DR are required provided the hero does not exit the hex from which he last conducted a NOBA action; otherwise, a normal maintenance DR is required. While the hero is directing the NOBA, Battery Access is gained automatically [EXC: subsequent Battery Access draws are required as per C1.21].
6. Direction of the U.S. NOBA battery will be permanently assumed by a Shipboard Observer (G14.68) immediately if the initial U.S. hero loads onto an LC. Becomes wounded, or loses Good Order status.
7. To represent flanking fire, during the MPB/DPB of each U.S. Player Turn, the Japanese may conduct up to three \(\pm 1\) FP attacks against any Ocean hex(es), resolved as though they were Residual Fire attacks.

**AFTERMATH:** Lacking radio equipment with which to communicate their plight, the isolated Marines were able to signal a liaison aircraft by spelling out "HELF" with their t-shirts. Once word of the Marines’ predicament was reported to HQ, Cheesey Puller bounded the Monsoon, and with a hand of landing craft headed to the initial landing site. When the Monsoon reached station, it could not communicate with the retreating Marines until Sergeant Robert Raybrook exposed himself to fire in order to semaphore fire directions to the destroyer. Under cover of the Monsoon’s guns and occasional strafing runs made by the liaison plane, the Marines reached the beach and setup a hostile perimeter. As the landing craft approached the beach, they began taking flanking fire from the promontory of Point Cruz. As soon as the boats reached, the Marines boarded under the covering fire provided by the craft’s manning Coast Guardsmen. For his outstanding performance contributing to such fire during this evacuation, Coast Guardsman Douglas Monroe was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor—the only Coast Guardsman to receive this award. In the end the 1st Battalion was successfully evacuated, but at a cost of 18 Marines killed and 25 wounded.
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

MATANIKAU RIVER, GUADALCANAL, 12 October 1942: Marine offensive operations in the area near the Matanikau River were scaled back due to reports of a massive Japanese attack on the main Henderson Field defensive perimeter. A large supply of mortar shells had been transferred to the front for use during the postponed operations along the river and had been abandoned by the Marines pulled back to their staging areas. This ammunition had to be recovered before the Japanese stumbled upon it and used it against the Marines. A reinforced company was set out to locate and retrieve the shell crates emblazoned with “U.S. Government Property.”

VICTORY CONDITIONS: Provided the Japanese have amassed ≤ 19 CVP, the Marines win immediately by exiting ≥ 21 mortar shell PP off the north edge.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:
- In the Marine OB, delete one HMG and one MMG.
- In SSR 3, change “60+mm (per U.S. Ordnance Note 1)” to “100+mm (HE and SMOKE).”

TURN RECORD CHART

SPECIAL RULES:
1. EC are Wet, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect [EXC: all buildings are huts (G.5)]. Intense Heat Haze (F1.61) is in effect. Place overlays as follows: OS on U3/U4, WD5 on Z5/AA5, WD2 on DD4/EE5, WD3 on T6/T7, WD4 on Y7/Z8, and S12 on M6/L6. A ford (B20.8) exists in hex S0/L3.

2. Prior to setup, place an Ammo Box counter in hex R2. This counter represents the abandoned mortar shell stockpile. The stockpile may not be possessed, recovered, moved, or destroyed [EXC: during its MPH, any Marine Infantry unit in R2 may declare that it is attempting to recover mortar shells and does so as if it were recovering a 3PP SW (only 2PP are recovered by a SMC), use A-T Mine or Ammo Box counters to represent the mortar shells which may be portaged/transported/recovered/dropped/eliminated as if a SW. The 2.5 Ton Truck may load as many mortar shell PP (up to its 29PP capacity) as started the MPH in the Location with it by remaining stopped throughout the MPH in that Location provided ≥ 1 Marine MMC in that hex which has not fired or moved during that Player Turn becomes T1 and remains unpinned and Good Order throughout the MPH. A unit possessing mortar shell PP may, in lieu of actually loading onto the truck, load its shells onto the truck. Hex R2 has an inexhaustible supply of shells]. Units portaging mortar shells may not use Double Time movement, and may exit the map via the north edge (without counting as eliminated).

3. The Marines receive one module of 60+mm OBA (per U.S. Ordnance Note 1).

AFTERMATH: Just as the Marines reached the shells, they spotted some Japanese infantry and engaged them in a brief firefight. The heat and humidity made it extremely difficult to judge the effect of fire on the enemy. As the fighting intensified, the Marines reported the presence of a strong enemy force along the south bank. Headquarters, not anxious to lose an entire battalion of men over the shells, ordered the 3rd Marines to pull back. The Japanese would later discover the stockpile and destroy it to prevent the Marines from recovering the ammunition.
THE SAND SPIT

ASL SCENARIO HS11

MATANIKAU RIVER MOUTH, GUADALCANAL, 23 October 1942: The leading elements of the elite 2nd Sendai Division had arrived on Guadalcanal with the same orders as their predecessors—eliminate the Marine beachhead. With ample manpower, the Japanese commanders planned to attack the perimeter from the west and the south. The main effort would be from the south, with the western attack being a diversion. Unlike previous attacks, the Sendai Division would be reinforced by a company of tanks. The tanks were to lead the western assault, the noise of their deployment masked by artillery. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the southern attack was delayed but word never reached the western assault. They moved out on schedule, unsupported, against a dug-in enemy.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:

☆ In the Victory Conditions, change “≥ 20” to “≥ 25”.

- Add two DCs to the Japanese OB.

VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Japanese win at game end if there is ≥ 20 CVP of Good Order Japanese Infantry units and/or mobile AFV east of the river/effluent.

TURN RECORD CHART

☆ AMERICAN Sets Up First

- JAPANESE Moves First [320]

Elements of I Company, 1st Marines and B Battery, 1st Special Weapons Battalion [ELR: 5] set up east of the river/effluent: (SAN: 2)

Elements of II Battalion, 4th Regiment and 1st Independent Tank Company [ELR: 4] enter on/after Turn 1 along the west edge: (SAN: 2)

SPECIAL RULES:

1. EC are Wet, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G:1) is in effect including Light Jungle (G:2:1). Place overlays as follows: Be2 with 201/202 on 40M10/40M9; Be1 with 101/102 on 52M10/52M9; Ef1 on 40L3/L4, Oc1 with 1001/1002 on 222/223; Oc2 with 2001/2002 on 1009/1010, G5 on 40S1/S2; S2 on 40N1/01; Wd5 on 40T6/S7; Wd4 on 40U8/T8; Wd3 on 40X9/W10; Ow1 on 40P4/P5; X29 on 40R6.

2. Night rules (E1) are in effect. Base NVR is two hexes with Scattered Clouds and No Moon. The Japanese are the Scenario Attacker and the Americans are the Scenario Defender. The Majority Squad Type for the Japanese is Stealthy and for the Marines is Normal.

3. The River is deep with a moderate Current to the north. All buildings are Huts. No hedges exist. All Level 1 hills are Level 0. Beach Slope is Slight [Exc: only one shallow ocean hex exists; G13:4].

4. The Americans receive one module of 100+mm OBA (HE and Smoke).

5. Four of the five Wire counters must be placed in hexes 209, 219, 400N1, and 400O1. A-P minefield factor exchange for A-T Mines (B28:5) is NA.

6. The Japanese OB is elite (C8:2).

AFTERMATH: The tanks formed the vanguard of the Japanese attack and slowly made their way out onto the sand spit. Several of the tanks were engaged and destroyed by the Marine's anti-tank guns and a French 75mm cannon belonging to the 1st Special Weapons Battalion. The accompanying Japanese infantry, slowed by accurate artillery fire, failed to dislodge the Marines from their positions on the east bank of the Matanikau. The resulting piles of casualties on the east bank gave mute testament to the nickname the Marines had given this spot—Hell's Corner.
CHESTY'S TURN

LUNGA RIDGE, GUADALCANAL, 24 October 1942: It was more than a month before the Japanese had reinforced Guadalcanal sufficiently to both replace September's losses and to launch further attacks against the Marine perimeter. During that same period, however, the Marines received considerable reinforcements. Among those joining the 1st Marine Division were the 7th Marine Regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis "Chesty" Puller. Upon learning that Puller was on the island, Raider commander Colonel Merritt Edson remarked, "Now the Raiders have some competition." The Marines expected a renewed Japanese attack from the west, near the Matanikau river, by October. That was precisely what the Japanese commanders wanted them to think. They further aided this with a feint toward the river. Their real push, however, would come from the south, just to the east of Edson's Ridge. Having sent most of his men to the west, General Vandegrift had left Puller's men spread very thin.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:
- In the initial American OB, replace one MMG with a .50cal HMG.
- In the Victory Conditions, change "≥ 25" to "≥ 20".

SPECIAL RULES:
1. EC are Mud and Overcast, with no wind at Start. See ER SSR. Night rules (EL1) are in effect. Base NVR is 2 hexes with Scattered Clouds and a Full Moon. The Americans are the Scenario Defender while the Japanese are the Scenario Attacker. The Majority Squad Type for the Japanese is Stealthy and for the Americans is Normal.
2. A path extends from H23–N23 through hexes with a coordinate of 23. A path also connects U20–Q22. Prior to setup, place a Shetland counter in hexes Q23, O24, P27, Q28, S26 and R23. Other terrain in these hexes does not exist [EXC: hills].
3. Cloaked Japanese MMG need not be dismantled.
4. Japanese 4-4-8s/2-4-8s are Assault Engineers (H1.22).
5. The best American Leader receives automatic Freedom of Movement (EL1.21) following the first Japanese (non-Sniper, non-Ambush CC) attack.

AFTERMATH: Japanese troops, exhausted by their march through a rain-soaked and muddy jungle, reached the wire marking the American perimeter two hours behind schedule. Some Japanese units attempted to infiltrate the Marine positions but, in front of C Company, the 9th Company launched a massive Banzai charge. Among the Marine defenders was machine gunner Sergeant John Baslone. Firing into the charging Japanese horde, he would stand his ground and nearly single-handedly destroy an entire company of attacking Japanese infantry. His actions during this battle would later earn him the Medal of Honor. Elsewhere along the southern front, the Japanese made more progress but, with the coming of daylight, the Marines successfully counterattacked and erased the enemy salient.
THE RAVINE

Near Hill 81, Guadalcanal, 24 November 1942: The Japanese offensive had been brought to an end by tenacious American defenses, as well as by numerous Japanese blunders. The Japanese had not quit the fight, however. Just as the Americans were beginning to expand their beachhead westward, the Japanese began to fortify their positions, particularly in the hills west of the Matanikau. The westward U.S. advance threatened supply routes leading to inland positions. Therefore, the Japanese had created an extensive fortified zone in the path of the U.S. advance. Using reverse slope positions that couldn’t be hit by artillery, the Japanese turned the jungle ravine in front of Hills 80 and 81 into a death trap. Twice the U.S. Army’s 164th Infantry tried to penetrate the Japanese defenses, only to gain a mere 40 yards. The 182nd Infantry was ordered to assist, but still no progress was made. In light of these failures, the 8th Marines were called forward to try.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

- Exchange two 1+3+5 Pillboxes in the Japanese OB for two 1+5+7 Pillboxes.
- Delete one Type 97 mortar and 2-2-8 crew from the Japanese OB.

VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Americans win at game end if they Control 2 or 6 Level 2 Hill hexes in the Japanese set up area provided the Japanese have amassed ≤ 20 CVP.

TURN RECORD CHART

- JAPANESE Sets Up First [196]
- AMERICAN Moves First [196]

Elements of 1st Battalion, 228th Infantry Regiment [ELR: 4] set up on north of hexrow G on board 11 and hexrow Z on board 35: [SAN: 4]

Elements of 8th Marines [ELR: 5] set up south of hexrow G on board 11 and hexrow Z on board 35: [SAN: 3]

Enter on Turn 3 along the south edge:

SPECIAL RULES:

1. EC are Moist, with no wind at start. PTO terrain is in effect (G.1), including Light Jungle, Walls and Hedges do not exist. All buildings are Huts (G.5). The stream is Dry (B20,21, B16, G7.1). Grain depictions on the G5 and G2 overlays represent Level 2 Hill hexes. Place overlays as follows: 5 11G2-G1; Wd4 on 11F7-E8; Wd3 on 11M4-N3; G2 on 11M7-M8; G5 on 11D3-E3. Kindling is NA.

2. The Marines have one module of 100+mm OBA (HE and Smoke only) and one pre-registered hex. NOBA LOS (G14.62) and Reverse Slopes (G14.66) are in effect. Fire is traced from 36GG6. In all other respects the OBA module is treated normally.

AFTERMATH: The artillery battalion supporting the Marine attack fired 2,600 rounds prior to and during the attack. Some of the fire even wounded Lt. General Hyakutake and other high-ranking Japanese officers whose divisional command post at Kokumbona was nearby. The Japanese positions, able to bring fire from both ends of the ravine, proved too much for the Marines. The U.S. commanders finally concluded that “Further advance would not be possible without accepting casualties in numbers to preclude the advisability of this action.” The Japanese had stalemated them, and nothing more would happen on Guadalcanal until the December offensives.
VICTORY CONDITIONS: Provided the Japanese amass ≤ 13 CVP, the Americans win immediately by exiting ≥ 13 Exit VP /EXC: Prisoners do not count off the south edge or at game end by amassing ≥ 26 CVP. Prisoners do not count double for CVP and the U.S. receives one CVP for each tunnel entrance/exit eliminated (B8.63).

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:
- Add two 1+3+5 Pillboxes to the Japanese OB.
- Add two 3-4-7 H.S. and two DCs to the U.S. OB.

TURN RECORD CHART
- JAPANESE Sets Up First [196]
- AMERICAN Moves First [187]

Elements of 124th and 228th Infantry Regiments and the 10th Mountain Gun Artillery [ELR: 3] set up on south of hexrow W (see SSR 3): [SAN: 5]

Elements of 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry Regiment [ELR: 3] enter on Turn 1 along the north edge: [SAN: 3]

SPECIAL RULES:
1. EC are Moist, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect /EXC: no roads (or paths) exist/. All Huts are Bamboo.
2. Multiple pillboxes may set up in the same hex. Units IN one pillbox have no LOS to, nor may they attack (including CC), units IN another pillbox in the same hex. A single CC attack may not target units IN multiple pillboxes.
3. Japanese units set up in suitable terrain may do so Entrenched (B27.1). Each pillbox is connected to every other pillbox within 3 hexes by a single tunnel (B8.6) (i.e., there is only one tunnel entrance/exit IN each pillbox). Other tunnels are NA. For the purposes of B8.63 (only), all tunnel entrances/exit of Known pillboxes are assumed to have been used within the LOS of all American units. Movement through a tunnel into a pillbox is treated as if from a Cave Complex to a Cave (G11.75). Light Mortars can be fired from a Pillbox Location (even if the Pillbox occupies Dense Jungle).

AFTERMATH: The Japanese maintained positions outside the pillbox line to prevent attackers from drawing too close. The Americans were forced to fight for each yard of ground. By 1335 hours, after moving only a short distance, the American companies had been completely halted by machine-gun and rifle fire from the front and both flanks. The regimental commander ordered the troops to retire to their original positions while howitzers shelled the enemy positions. Despite several additional attempts, the Americans were unsuccessful taking The Gifu until it was completely isolated. With the defenders weakened by starvation and disease, The Gifu was taken with almost no fighting on January 23rd.
HILL 27
Scenario Design: Kevin Valerien

HILL 27, GUADALCANAL, 2 January 1943: Hill 27 was a separate rocky elevation, 920 feet high, just east of the Gifu. The leading assault troops of the 2nd Battalion gained the summit of the hill at 0907 without firing a shot. By 1130 hours the entire assault force had reached the summit, the Japanese having been completely surprised. The 2nd Battalion began to organize a defense on Hill 27, but digging in was difficult. Before the preparations could be completed, the Japanese to the north had recovered from their surprise and attacked to recapture the hill.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Japanese win at the end of any Game Turn if they Control ≥ 12 Level 2 Hill hexes.

BALANCE:
☆ Add two 1S Foxholes to the U.S. OB.
- In the Victory Conditions change “12” to “10”.

TURN RECORD CHART
☆ AMERICAN Sets Up First [110]
- JAPANESE Moves First [181]

Elements of 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry [ELR: 3] set up on Overlay Hi7: [SAN: 3]

Elements of 124th and 228th Infantry Regiments [ELR: 3] enter on Turn 1 along the north edge on/between hexrows J and T: [SAN: 3]

SPECIAL RULES:
1. EC are Moist, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect including Light Jungle (G2.1) [EXC: Interior Jungle hexes are Dense; no paths exist].
2. Place Overlay Hi7 on S2T7/S8. All Bamboo on Overlay Hi7 is Kunai.
3. All Entrenchment attempts suffer an additional +1 DRM.
4. American units rout towards Entrenchments as if they were woods and American units IN Entrenchments treat them as woods for Rally purposes.

5. Prior to setup, the Americans may select ≤ 4 American MMC to begin play marked with a -1 Labor marker which applies to those units’ Entrenching attempts (B24.8, B27.11).

AFTERMATH: The lack of entrenching tools and the rocky, jungle soil left this work unfinished when the Japanese violently reacted to the 2nd Battalion’s success. Mortars, machine guns, and grenade launchers began to impact among the Battalions’ positions. The Japanese launched six successive counterattacks that afternoon, but the Americans held firm. With nightfall, the 2nd Battalion pulled back off the bare crest to a narrower enclave on the reverse slope of Hill 27. The Japanese pressed around three sides of this new position during the night, but were disrupted by abundant American supporting artillery fire. At dawn, on the 3rd of January, the 2nd Battalion re-occupied the military crest of Hill 27.
VICTORY CONDITIONS: The Americans win immediately when they control all Level 3 Hill Hexes.

BOARD CONFIGURATION:

BALANCE:
- In the Japanese OB, replace two 3-4-7s with two 4-4-7s.
- In the American OB, replace one MMG with one .50cal HMG.

SPECIAL RULES:
1. EC are Moist, with no wind at start. PTO Terrain (G.1) is in effect.
2. No cliffs exist; treat all cliff hexes as either single or double crest lines as appropriate. The depicted terrain on hill hexes does not exist; all hill hexes contain Inherent Kunai. Level 0 hexes are not in play. For LOS purposes treat those hexes as Level 0 Dense Jungle. All Level 4 hill hexes are treated as Level 3.
3. Japanese units (and their possessed SW) set up in eligible terrain may do so Entrenched (B27.1). At least one Pillbox must be set up within two hexes of J3. Tunnel entrances may be in Kunai.
4. No American units may gain concealment prior to the start of play.
5. After Japanese setup, but prior to American setup, the American player may remove one 8-1 leader from the American OB. Upon doing so, the Americans may select any single hex in the Japanese setup area. All HIP units/fortifications in/adjacent-to the selected hex must be immediately placed on board (unconcealed).

AFTERMATH: Captain Charles Davis, the Battalion Executive Officer, and four men crawled and wriggled their way down the west slope to within ten yards of the Japanese strongpoint. The Americans attacked with grenades, then sprang up and rushed the enemy. Captain Davis' rifle jammed after only one round, so he drew his pistol and kept with his men into the Japanese strongpoint finishing it off with small-arms fire. E Company, after witnessing this bold rush, were inspired and drove uphill to sweep the Japanese from Sims Ridge. For his gallant action, Captain Davis later received the Medal of Honor.
August 21, 1942...Colonel Ichiki’s men were practically wiped out the night before in wave after wave of banzai attacks across the Tenaru into the well-prepared Marine defenses. Canister, machine-gun fire, and courage had broken Ichiki’s back. As dawn rose above the sand bar it was time for the Marines to mop up...

September 27, 1942...The Marines, anxious to take the fight to the Japanese, mount an ambitious plan to surround and destroy the majority of the Japanese forces at the mouth of the Matanikau River. A three-pronged attack, each prong depending on the others succeeding, was devised. When the first attack to take river crossing points failed, messages to cancel the remainder of the offensive were never received and the remaining elements of the offensive soon went from the hunters to the hunted. Could Marine Corps legend Chesty Puller extract his men from this sticky situation...

History. That’s why many gamers enjoy ASL—its ability to simulate a historical battle. Yet how can you study an entire campaign while still enjoying your favorite tactical game? This package addresses that need. A Historical Study will touch upon all aspects of a campaign either by incorporating part of it into a campaign game or by presenting a representative scenario to help enlighten the player as to why particular choices may have been made. All while enjoying the world’s best squad-level tactical game.

Operation: Watchtower is the first of the Historical Studies, which is appropriate since Guadalcanal was the first American offensive in the Pacific. Hopefully, once a player has played through the sixteen scenarios within, they’ll better understand the campaign and its outcome.

Operation: Watchtower is not a complete game. Ownership of the ASL Rulebook, all core modules, Action Pack #2, and boards 5, 15, 43, and 52 are required for play.

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